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Abstract
Energy-usage monitoring can expose much of what takes place inside
people’s homes and offices. As the “smart home” revolution continues,
this data will only become more revealing. Though this information is
essential for the development of the smart electric grid, it is also useful to
a variety of others: law enforcement, energy-efficiency experts, and
marketers. At present, this data enjoys little Fourth Amendment or
statutory protection. This was not previously a problem because the
information was historically not overly sensitive. Now that utilities are
collecting more than two thousand times as much information about
households as they were before, however, more protection is needed. This
Article traces the rise of “smart meter” technology, evaluates the Fourth
Amendment implications of law enforcement access to smart meter
records, and proposes a statutory framework to govern public and private
access to such data. It also reflects on the growing challenge of protecting
digital privacy in an era where once undetectable information is now
readily and involuntarily shared with third parties and on the Fourth
Amendment implications of failing to restrict private use of sensitive
data.
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At the [Fourth Amendment’s] very core stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.1
INTRODUCTION
As cellular location data show what you do outside the home, energyusage data show what you do inside of it. Recent changes in how energyusage data is collected and analyzed have drastically altered how much
can be inferred from this once innocuous information. This change in
information intrusiveness requires a similar change in information
protection. This Article sets out a proposal for enhanced energy privacy,
calling for an expansion of Fourth Amendment protections and new
federal regulations.
To understand why this data is important, think about how the energy
usage of a given house might fluctuate from midnight to midnight. At 1
AM, energy usage dips as the dishwasher and clothes dryer set to run
before the occupants went to bed finish their preprogrammed cycles. At
5:50 AM, a sharp but brief surge signals the activation of a coffeemaker
bringing water rapidly to boil. At 6:03 AM, there is a slight rise as lights
begin to turn on. At 6:15 AM, the electric water heater begins a new cycle;
someone is showering. The data progress onwards to the dip in usage
when the last occupant leaves the house for the day, to the steady rise as
person after person returns home after work or school, to again a decline
in the evening as people move gradually toward bed. The data look
harmless at first, but the patterns rapidly become clear. This regular
cycling is the furnace, refrigerator, or air conditioner. That sharp spike is
a hair dryer or electric kettle. Soon it becomes possible to tell stories—
the house is empty at one time and full at another. A weekday in this
house follows this rhythm. A weekend follows a different one. This
weekend? The occupants hosted a party. That weekend? They came home
late every night. All this data is neatly recorded and stored.

1. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
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This kind of granular energy-usage data can now be routinely
collected and shared with local utilities by “smart meters.”2 This
collection brings with it many benefits, but it comes at a real privacy cost.
Normally, it would leave no trace you were home alone, watching TV. It
is the archetypal bad alibi. But energy-usage data provides new
opportunities. Was the power usage of your house consistent with
someone being home at 7 PM, or did energy consumption only begin to
rise hours later? Was there a short spike to indicate that a 1200-watt
microwave set to work on a bag of Orville Redenbacher popcorn? The
proposed alibi is now testable. Police have already pursued a homicide
suspect based in part on smart meter data showing unusual late-night
water usage, which they believed suggested the cleanup of a crime scene.3
Some might think this is great: now the government can easily
determine when you are at home. This will make it easier to investigate
crimes and serve warrants. But even if that seems unproblematic, how
readily should this data be shared? Should it be available to university
researchers looking for potential energy-efficiency improvements? Local
department stores hoping to sell you a more efficient clothes dryer? Lowlevel government employees who may also be your neighbors? Tech
companies looking to improve the efficiency and “smartness” of your
home?
Many products of the “smart home” revolution pose substantial
privacy risks. People buying an Amazon Alexa or Google Home are
effectively paying for the privilege of installing microphones and
recorders in their own houses.4 But smart meters are a unique kind of
privacy threat. They are involuntarily installed by governmental or quasigovernmental actors: your local utilities. You often cannot simply choose
not to have one installed. And they blur the line between public and
private surveillance, as the relationship between your utility and the
2. See infra Section I.B.
3. Affidavit of Probable Cause to Obtain an Arrest Warrant, Arkansas v. Bates, No.
CR20160370 (Ark. Cir. Feb. 22, 2016), 2016 WL 7587396. The police affidavit for probable
cause supporting the arrest warrant noted that the smart water meters in Bentonville take hourly
measurements of electricity and water. See id. The data from the smart meter revealed that on the
night of the murder, between 1:00 AM and 3:00 AM, the suspect’s residence used 140 gallons of
water. Id. The affidavit asserted that the amount of water used during that time period was
consistent with spraying down the back-patio area to clean off blood. Id. “Upon reviewing all
water usage information, since October 2013 at James’ residence, this excessive amount of water
usage between [1:00 AM and 3:00 AM] had never before occurred.” Id. Charges were later
dropped. E.g., Colin Dwyer, Arkansas Prosecutors Drop Murder Case That Hinged on Evidence
from Amazon Echo, NPR (Nov. 29, 2017, 5:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/11/29/567305812/arkansas-prosecutors-drop-murder-case-that-hinged-on-evidencefrom-amazon-echo [https://perma.cc/9EGF-2K7S].
4. See Scott Carey, Does Amazon Alexa or Google Home Listen to My Conversations?,
TECHWORLD (May 25, 2018), https://www.techworld.com/security/does-amazon-alexa-listen-tomy-conversations-3661967/ [https://perma.cc/PJL8-FYVQ].
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government is fundamentally determined by history and geography rather
than something that you can choose.5
Home energy-usage information was historically of limited use.
Analog meters were only read once a month (and sometimes not that
often), so they did not reveal much beyond whether the occupant was a
real energy hog.6 But now digital smart meters can be read every hour,
every quarter hour, or even every five minutes, and there is no great
barrier to more frequent measurements.7 This allows for the
disaggregation of energy signatures—turning coarse electricity-usage
data into a rich narrative of devices switching on and off. The level of
granularity described in the first paragraph is still difficult to see—though
achievable if the meter is collecting minute-by-minute data—but that
may change over time.8 A smart meter can link to other devices in the
home.9 Connect a smart meter to a smart home’s management hub—
which in turn is able to sync with all the smart devices in the household—
and the meter will know exactly what some of the big appliances in the
home are doing. This will explain much of the home’s energy usage,
leaving the remaining fluctuations easier to process.
Right now, society is in a transitional period. Smart meters have been
installed in much of the country and will only be expanding their reach
in the future. But algorithms and tie-in products for smart meters have not
yet reached their full potential, so much of their value—both for grid
management and for privacy invasion—is in the near future rather than
the present. In this way, this Article provides anticipatory
recommendations for adequately protecting privacy in the home while
also allowing for the development of a more efficient smart home.
Many actors are interested in accessing this energy usage data.
Researchers and companies want this information to identify customers,
improve product design, and analyze energy consumption.10 Insurance
companies want to monitor whether an insured household is actually

5. See infra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Section I.A.
7. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE AND CUSTOMER
SYSTEMS: RESULTS FROM THE SMART GRID INVESTMENT GRANT PROGRAM 10 (2016).
8. See, e.g., Oliver Parson et al., An Unsupervised Training Method for Non-Intrusive
Appliance Load Monitoring, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 2014, at 1; see also infra notes 95–
100 and accompanying text (explaining how information can be extrapolated from smart meter
readings).
9. See infra Section I.B; see also Stream My Data FAQs, PAC. GAS & ELECTRIC CO.,
https://www.pge.com/en_US/residential/save-energy-money/analyze-your-usage/your-usage/
view-and-share-your-data-with-smartmeter/reading-the-smartmeter/stream-your-data-faq.page
[https://perma.cc/X8TG-GJBB] (explaining smart meter integration with smart home devices).
10. Samuel J. Harvey, Note, Smart Meters, Smarter Regulation: Balancing Privacy and
Innovation in the Electric Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2068, 2079 (2014).
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occupied.11 Solar providers could use this information to tailor their
product offerings to match a consumer’s energy-consumption level.12
Researchers have even proposed examining energy-usage patterns to
check on the health of elderly people who live alone.13 This data, in many
ways, are a marketer’s dream.14 Would it not be great to be able to tell
consumers exactly how much money or energy they would save if they
switched to a more efficient water heater?
In both the public and private contexts, then, there is substantial use
for this data. It provides unique value to those seeking to better manage
the electric grid and design energy-efficiency programs. It allows law
enforcement to better understand what is happening inside homes to
better solve crimes. And it allows for a whole new approach to targeted
marketing of the home and the creation of smart homes. But, in all these
cases, consumers are left without a ready means of declining to
participate. Many utilities have required the installation of smart meters
and, absent extreme measures, it is difficult to forgo access to the electric
grid.15
11. April Weismann, How Does Occupancy and Vacancy Impact Insurance?, HPM INS.
(Jan. 3, 2018, 11:55 AM), https://www.hpminsurance.com/blog/how-does-occupancy-andvacancy-impact-insurance [https://perma.cc/VV8F-RPKR].
12. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Remaking Energy: The Critical Role of
Energy Consumption Data, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1095, 1102 (2016).
13. José Alcalá et al., Detecting Anomalies in Activities of Daily Living of Elderly Residents
via Energy Disaggregation and Cox Processes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND ACM
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EMBEDDED SYSTEMS FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENT BUILT
ENVIRONMENTS 225, 225 (2015). Using device disaggregation, researchers believe that they can
tell enough about the living patterns of these elderly residents to determine when those patterns
have been unduly disrupted by a health event. Id. at 233. The critical advantage of such monitoring
is that it requires no additional sensors—the smart meter itself is enough. See BOSCH SOFTWARE
INNOVATIONS GMBH, WHICH NEW SERVICES CAN ENERGY PROVIDERS OFFER IN THE IOT
ENVIRONMENT? 14 (2018), https://www.bosch-si.com/connected-energy/insights/downloads/
new-businessmodels.html [https://perma.cc/CKQ5-PNBT] (commenting on this possibility,
among others).
14. A major advertising agency even “announced that it was teaming up with a Londonbased software company to study ways to collect smart meter data, saying that it would ‘open the
door of the home.’” Natasha H. Duarte, Recent Development, The Home Out of Context: The
Post-Riley Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93 N.C. L.
REV. 1140, 1156 (2015). Some companies have already started tracking this kind of data,
including smart-television companies such as VIZIO and insurance companies such as Blue Cross
Blue Shield, which tracks when consumers utilize sleep-apnea devices. See Marshall Allen, You
Snooze, You Lose: How Insurers Dodge the Costs of Popular Sleep Apnea Devices, NPR (Nov.
21, 2008, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/11/21/669751038/yousnooze-you-lose-how-insurers-dodge-the-costs-of-popular-sleep-apnea-devices [https://perma.cc
/4AT2-KHZD]; Ben Gilbert, There’s a Simple Reason Your New Smart TV Was So Affordable:
It’s Collecting and Selling Your Data, and Serving You Ads, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 5, 2019,
9:27 AM), https://amp.businessinsider.com/smart-tv-data-collection-advertising-2019-1 [https://
perma.cc/7WAJ-9GLD].
15. See infra Section II.C.
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This lack of consumer choice and the detailed nature of the records
lead us to believe that people have an expectation of privacy in energyusage records and that the government should be required to obtain a
warrant if it wishes to access those records for law enforcement purposes.
The analysis required to reach this conclusion works differently for public
and private utilities. To begin, consider private utilities. Traditionally, the
Fourth Amendment did not protect this kind of information when it was
held by a private third party; the United States Supreme Court had held
that people do not have privacy interests in the information that they
voluntarily share with institutions such as banks and telephone
companies.16 Under this logic, energy-usage data in the hands of a private
utility would be treated as public information for Fourth Amendment
purposes.17 But the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v.
United States18 has shown a new openness to granting protection in cases,
like this one, where the introduction of new technology has
fundamentally shifted the nature of the privacy invasion and people do
not have a meaningful ability to avoid having their private behavior
exposed.19 Going forward, courts should recognize that consumers’
inability to effectively opt out of smart meter usage means they have not
voluntarily consented to the sharing of this data.
The Fourth Amendment analysis takes a different form in the public
utility context.20 Here, one must first distinguish between law
enforcement and non-law enforcement uses of the data. When the Fourth
Amendment is implicated, collection of information for law enforcement
purposes generally requires a warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement, but collection of information for non-law enforcement
purposes is governed under a more open reasonableness standard.21 Since
public utilities need granular energy-usage data for the purpose of better
managing the electric grid, we believe it is reasonable for the government
to collect that information for that purpose. It is unreasonable, however,
for the government to then repurpose this same information for use by
law enforcement absent a warrant given the intrusiveness of the data and
the way in which they allow the government to peer into the home. This
complex area of doctrine affects the privacy rights of the nearly 15% of
Americans who are serviced by a public utility.22
16. See infra Section II.A.
17. See infra Section II.A.
18. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
19. Id. at 2223 (protecting cell phone location records despite several dissents).
20. Though Natasha Duarte argued that the third-party doctrine should not apply to smart
meter data, Duarte, supra note 14, at 1153, this Article is the first to address how the Fourth
Amendment should regulate information collection by public utilities.
21. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
22. Stats and Facts, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, https://www.publicpower.org/publicpower/stats-and-facts [https://perma.cc/5C7F-TX5Y].
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The same lack of consumer choice that is important in the Fourth
Amendment context should lead Congress and state legislatures to pass
new laws protecting energy privacy from both governmental and nongovernmental intrusion. Previous work in this area has addressed the
challenge of standardizing energy-usage information to allow for greater
information sharing, pointing to the many potential benefits of granting
private actors access to this wealth of data.23 We differ from these
scholars in believing the extreme usefulness of this data poses a
substantial danger to individual privacy.24 We therefore propose an
aggressive regime that gives utilities the broad ability to use this data for
grid management but restricts further uses by third parties such as
marketers or energy-efficiency companies. Specifically, utilities should
only be able to share anonymized consumer data or aggregated data from
a specific town or community. If utilities desire to share specific
consumer information, they must obtain the consent of the consumer first
and this consent must be treated as limited in time and scope. These
principles should be codified by administrative regulations and
vigorously enforced by agency actions.
Part I of this Article provides background on the changing landscape
of energy management in the United States and introduces the
fundamental privacy trade-off of smart meters, examining the ways in
which they can expose the activities of the home. Part II analyzes the
intersection of smart meter data with Fourth Amendment privacy
protections. It considers both how the third-party doctrine should apply
to smart meters as well as how to think about the Fourth Amendment
when the government acts as a utility rather than as an enforcer of
criminal law. It also considers the interplay between public and private
privacy standards. In Part III, we move beyond the government context
and consider the kinds of legal protections necessary to prevent the
exploitation of energy-usage data by private parties. To this end, we
recommend a federal statute that regulates the sharing of energy-usage
data and provides restrictions for which entities can access the data and
for what purposes. Finally, this Article concludes by recognizing that
smart meters will be necessary for effective grid management in the
context of climate change and the increasing need to better manage
energy resources. But it cautions against the unregulated development of
smart meters and smart homes due to the need to protect the privacy of

23. Klass & Wilson, supra note 12, at 1102–03 (noting that the article “focus[ed in part] on
the difficulty in obtaining such information and its potential uses if gathered on a large scale”).
24. Id. at 1157 (“Concerns over reidentification of individual or residential energy
consumption data are generally less pressing than in other contexts, such as with health care or
education data.”); id. at 1158 (asserting that “the privacy or confidentiality interests in energy
consumption data may be overstated”).
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people within what is perhaps the last sacred place recognized by Fourth
Amendment law—the home.
I. THE CHANGING AMERICAN ELECTRIC GRID
In this Part we begin by considering how smart meters have changed
the nature of the American electric grid. The modern electric power
system, also known as the grid in the United States, is comprised of
generation units, transmission lines, and distribution wires.25 Electricity
is produced at generation units such as coal and natural gas power plants,
carried long distances—sometimes across several states—by
transmission lines, and then finally delivered to the end users along
distribution wires.26 The demand for electricity can vary considerably
hour to hour, day to day, and season to season.27 Since large-scale storage
of electricity is currently difficult, this necessitates the balancing of
electricity production and demand.28 If supply is unable to meet demand,
local blackouts or brownouts can result.29 Though this is unusual in the
United States, even here, isolated failures in the transmission or
distribution systems can trigger a cascade of breakdowns when demand

25. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 66 (4th ed. 2015).
26. See How Electricity Is Delivered to Consumers, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/delivery-to-consumers.php [https://perma.cc/
5DYL-544C] (last updated Oct. 11, 2019).
27. Electricity Demand Changes in Predictable Patterns, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4190 [https://perma.cc/M6GPEGM5] (“Changes in electricity demand levels are generally predictable and have daily, weekly,
and seasonal patterns.”).
28. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 67 (“This means that whenever customers turn the power
on or off the generating load must be increased or decreased almost instantaneously to avoid
affecting the voltage significantly.”); NEXIGHT GRP., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER
INDUSTRY NEEDS FOR GRID-SCALE STORAGE APPLICATIONS 5 (2010), https://www.energy.gov/
sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/Utility_12-30-10_FINAL_lowres.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DV67-DYCQ]; Felix Barber, The Future of Energy Storage: A Lost Opportunity for the
U.S.?, HARV. U.: SCI. POL’Y (Dec. 6, 2017), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/future-energystorage-lost-opportunity-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/6JQS-APJK] (“Despite its sparse use at present,
energy storage, and in particular batteries, could dramatically change the nature of [the grid]
system. This could happen by both offsetting the maximum power supply required from these
power plants, and by allowing renewables to provide a larger contribution than is possible with
conventional electric grids.”); Marshall Brain & Dave Roos, How Power Grids Work,
HOWSTUFFWORKS (Apr. 1, 2000), https://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/energy/
power.htm [https://perma.cc/7RJH-HNBA].
29. Sara Hoff, U.S. Electric System Is Made Up of Interconnections and Balancing
Authorities, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 20, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=27152 [https://perma.cc/W6E2-YKRV].
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for electricity is high, for example on the hottest day in summer.30 This
can lead to blackouts for millions of people.31
Demand fluctuates over the course of the day, the season, and the year.
As demand rises during peak periods—which is commonly in the late
afternoon or early evenings when everyone arrives home from work or
school32—more power plants must come online and provide the
additional electricity required for that short period of time.33 These
“peaker” electricity generators are idle much of the time and generally
are the least economical sources; the cheapest and most efficient power
generators run constantly.34 This careful balancing of supply and demand
of electricity gives rise to one of the recurring obsessions of modern
energy management: the shifting of demand from peak periods to offpeak periods to reduce costs.35

30. In 2003, the United States suffered its largest blackout, which resulted in “50 million
people across eight states and two Canadian provinces” losing power in eight minutes. Massoud
Amin & Phillip F. Schewe, Preventing Blackouts: Building a Smarter Power Grid, SCI. AM. (Aug.
14, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/preventing-blackouts-power-grid/ [https://
perma.cc/K3PU-B2UJ].
31. Marshall Brain & Julia Layton, How Blackouts Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Aug. 15,
2003), https://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/energy/blackout.htm [https://perma.cc/
FD4K-45QB] (“In nearly every major blackout, the situation is the same. One piece of the system
fails, and then the pieces near it cannot handle the increased load caused by the failure, so they
fail. The multiple failures make the problem worse and worse, and a large area ends up in the
dark.”); see Brain & Roos, supra note 28.
32. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 74; Beia Spiller, All Electricity Is Not Priced Equally:
Time-Variant Pricing 101, ENVTL. DEF. FUND: ENERGY EXCHANGE (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2015/01/27/all-electricity-is-not-priced-equally-timevariant-pricing-101/ [https://perma.cc/ZQQ6-3G3W].
33. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 74; Jeff St. John, Dueling Charts of the Day: Peaker
Plants vs. Green Power, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/dueling-charts-of-the-day-peaker-plants-vs-green-power [https://perma.cc/7AGM3H56]; see Bethel Afework et al., Peaking Power, ENERGY EDUC., https://energyeducation.ca
/encyclopedia/Peaking_power [https://perma.cc/87DB-QYPA] (last updated Sept. 3, 2018)
(“Natural gas power plants are the most common peaker power plants as they are dispatchable.
This means they can be turned on or off and their output can change quite quickly.”).
34. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 74 (“Generally, the electrical grid is organized so that
the least expensive available generation is used to meet the next increment of demand. When
demand is modest, the cheapest generators are able to satisfy it, resulting in modest prices.
However, during peak periods, all generation resources—even the most expensive—must be
called upon.”); Mike Orcutt, How a Smarter Grid Can Prevent Blackouts—and Cut Your Energy
Bills, POPULAR MECHANICS (Aug. 6, 2010), https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/
energy/a6013/how-a-smarter-grid-can-prevent-blackouts/ [https://perma.cc/NE4N-5CK5] (“Less
than half of the generation capacity in the U.S. comes from power plants designed to run all the
time to meet demand. . . . Reserve plants are much more expensive to operate, resulting in large
disparities in generation costs throughout the day and year.”).
35. Spiller, supra note 32 (explaining the use of time-variant pricing to shift demand).
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A. Smart Meters as Energy-Management Tools
Smart meters are a key tool for monitoring electricity demand
throughout the day. Use of electricity by consumers is generally tracked
by a meter that is installed on the consumer’s home or office.36
Traditionally, these meters were analog.37 A meter reader would come in
person once per month and, by examining the meter, determine that the
meter recorded 900 kilowatt-hours of electricity since it was last read.38
The utility would then bill the consumers for this monthly household
total.39 Neither the consumer nor the utility knew anything other than the
monthly total, however.40 There was no way to tell exactly when the
electricity was consumed at the home.41
This system for recording energy usage is changing. Smart meters
have replaced the traditional analog meters over the past decade, and as
of December 2018 almost 70% of residential units in the United States
have smart meters installed.42 Smart meters themselves come in various
types.43 The “dumbest” smart meters merely permit automated meter
reading (AMR); they broadcast monthly usage information.44 One variant
of AMR required a van to drive through neighborhoods and send out
radio signals to query the AMR meters so they would broadcast their
current usage.45 But more advanced smart meters can be in continuous
36. See Timothy Thiele, How an Electric Meter Reads Power Usage, SPRUCE,
https://www.thespruce.com/how-electric-meters-read-power-1152754 [https://perma.cc/ZU9D5QER] (last updated June 26, 2019).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation & Privacy International in
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Naperville Smart Meter Awareness & Reversal at 3, 18 n.31,
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 163766).
40. Karl Bode, Your Smart Electricity Meter Can Easily Spy on You, Court Ruling Warns,
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 24, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/j5n3pb/
your-smart-electricity-meter-can-easily-spy-on-you-court-ruling-warns [https://perma.cc/LL5RJL2F].
41. Id.
42. ADAM COOPER & MIKE SHUSTER, THE EDISON FOUND. INST. FOR ELEC. INNOVATION,
REPORT: ELECTRIC COMPANY SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS: FOUNDATION FOR A SMART GRID
(2019 UPDATE) 1 (Dec. 2019), https://www.edisonfoundation.net/iei/publications/Documents/
IEI_Smart%20Meter%20Report_2019_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUD6-9J5E].
43. E.g., Tim J. Smith, Shifting Paradigm: Automated Meter Reading (AMR), WIGLAF J.
(Sept. 2003), https://www.wiglafjournal.com/industry/energy-utilities/2003/09/shifting-paradigmautomated-meter-reading-amr/# [https://perma.cc/HY4B-7LXW].
44. Smart vs AMR Meters: What Is the Difference?, YÜ ENERGY (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.yuenergy.co.uk/news/smart-vs-amr-meters-what-is-the-difference [https://perma.cc
/3B64-34RM].
45. See Dan Benelisha Itron, For Safety’s Sake: AMR Technology Helps Take Meter
Readers, Customers Out of Harm’s Way, ELECTRIC ENERGY T&D MAG. (May/June 2002), https://
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communication with the local utility.46 These more advanced smart
meters are part of a larger push for the development of the “smart grid”
and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI).47 AMI enables two-way
communication between customers and their utilities.48 An AMI-style
smart meter can transmit usage information to the utility, receive from
the utility various pieces of data (such as current power costs), and even
interface with home energy hubs.49 If traditional analog meters are like
classic landline telephones, then AMR meters are equivalent to 1990sstyle flip cell phones and 2010s-style AMI smart meters are the iPhone.
When speaking of smart meters, we have in mind these “smarter”
smart meters.50 Once installed on a home, these smart meters
automatically and remotely transmit consumer electricity-usage data to
utility companies in short intervals, sometimes with several readings per
electricenergyonline.com/energy/magazine/36/article/For-Safety-s-Sake-AMR-TechnologyHelps-Take-Meter-Readers-Customers-Out-of-Harm-s-Way.htm [https://perma.cc/S6KF-2LJA].
46. See, e.g., Smart vs AMR Meters: What Is The Difference?, supra note 44 (“AMR meters
only provide kWh information and possible peak kW demand for the month. Smart meters send
a lot more information, including[:] cumulative kWh usage, daily usage, peak kW demand,
voltage information, outage information, time of use kWh and peak kW readings.”).
47. See ADAM COOPER, THE EDISON FOUND. INST. FOR ELEC. INNOVATION, REPORT:
ELECTRIC COMPANY SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS: FOUNDATION FOR A SMART GRID 3 (2017);
Raymar Rashed Mohassel et al., A Survey on Advanced Metering Infrastructure, 63 ELECTRICAL
POWER & ENERGY SYSTEMS 473, 474 (2014)
AMI is not a single technology; rather, it is a configured infrastructure that
integrates a number of technologies to achieve its goals. The infrastructure
includes smart meters, communication networks in different levels of the
infrastructure hierarchy, Meter Data Management Systems (MDMS), and means
to integrate the collected data into software application platforms and interfaces.
The Smart Home, SMARTGRID.GOV, https://www.smartgrid.gov/the_smart_grid/smart_home
.html [https://perma.cc /LWN4-VGP3] (“Smart meters provide the Smart Grid interface between
you and your energy provider.”).
48. See Mohassel et al., supra note 47, at 475.
49. See id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 7, at 10.
Control technologies include devices such as programmable communicating
thermostats (PCTs) and direct load control (DLC) devices that utilities and
customers use to automatically control customers’ heating and cooling systems
or other energy-intensive devices. In addition, home-area networks (HAN) and
energy management systems can be installed to automatically control appliances
in response to price signals, load conditions, or pre-set preferences. (emphasis
omitted).
50. In addition to raising greater privacy challenges, AMI systems are also now more
common in the United States. See Harvey, supra note 10, at 2072; Marc Harnish, Electricity
Monthly Update, Highlights: February 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 27, 2015),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/archive/april2015/ [https://perma.cc/3FG7-VZB7];
COOPER & SHUSTER, supra note 42.
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hour.51 This greatly increases the amount of information available to
utilities, allowing for a variety of new efficiencies but coming at the
expense of consumer privacy.
Smart meters are produced by a variety of manufacturers and have
different levels of functionality. Many use Zigbee, a data transmission
protocol specifically intended for the conveyance of information by lowpower, low-bandwidth radios, including smart meter data.52 But
variations exist, and not all smart meters have the same capacity to
interface with consumer products such as smart thermostats, smart
appliances, and energy dashboards.53 And not all utilities have been
equally active in incorporating consumers into the power-management
process. For example, a utility in Ohio offers an “easy-to-use app” that
allows the user to see energy usage over time, determine how much
energy is drawn by heating and ventilation systems, and, with the aid of
a free “energy bridge,” directly control smart devices straight from the
app.54 In contrast, a utility in New York is currently advertising no
51. Christine Horne et al., Privacy, Technology, and Norms: The Case of Smart Meters, 51
SOC. SCI. RES. 64, 65 (2015).
52. Joe Ballif, How Smart Energy by the Zigbee Alliance Enables Service Providers and
Consumers to Improve Consumption Habits and Save Money, ZIGBEE ALLIANCE (June 26, 2018),
https://zigbee.org/zigbee-alliance-smart-energy-saving-mony-1/ [https://perma.cc/B38X-Q8LR];
Benjamin Garcia, ZigBee Smart Energy, TELDAT (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.teldat.com/blog/
en/zigbee-smart-energy-smart-metering-home-automation/ [https://perma.cc/6NZ4-RQLX].
53. Not even all devices that use Zigbee are able to communicate with each other due to
different, and sometimes proprietary, profiles or protocols. See, e.g., J.D. Roberts, FAQ: Zigbee
Application Profiles, or Why Not All Zigbee Devices Work with SmartThings, SMARTTHINGS
COMMUNITY (June 25, 2019, 8:28 AM), https://community.smartthings.com/t/faq-zigbeeapplication-profiles-or-why-not-all-zigbee-devices-work-with-smartthings/76219
[https://perma.cc/T498-QRVP]. This concern seems to have been mitigated with the release of
Zigbee 3.0. See, e.g., Mike Bleakmore, Understanding the Zigbee 3.0 Protocol, DIGI (Apr. 19,
2018), https://www.digi.com/blog/understanding-the-zigbee-3-0-protocol/ [https://perma.cc/
HYY8-PHT2]. Products are therefore sometimes advertised as being compatible with specific
utility providers. See, e.g., Supported California Utilities, RAINFOREST AUTOMATION,
https://rainforestautomation.com/state-california-residents/ [https://perma.cc/PPF4-KP4W]. For
example, at least some utilities in six states (California, Texas, Illinois, Vermont, Hawaii, and
Pennsylvania) support the Rainforest Eagle 200 Energy Monitoring Gateway. Supported Utilities,
RAINFOREST AUTOMATION, https://rainforestautomation.com/utilities/ [https://perma.cc/XTP2GCR7]. This device uses Zigbee to communicate directly with a compatible smart meter and
display real-time energy-consumption information. See EAGLE-200™ Intelligent Control
Gateway, RAINFOREST AUTOMATION (2017), https://rainforestautomation.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/eagle-200-datasheet_1.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYT5-9YH8].
54. Smart Meter Technologies, AEP OHIO, https://www.aepohio.com/info/smart
meters/technologies.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZY49-WX2T]; Enhance your App Experience, AEP
OHIO, https://itsyourpowerohio.com/energy-bridge/ [https://perma.cc/9JM8-QS8L]. The utility
DTE Energy, based in Detroit, uses a similar program that connects an app with an Energy Bridge
to enable customs to connect their smart home devices and therefore better control their energy
usage. DTE Insight FAQs, DTE ENERGY, https://newlook.dteenergy.com/wps/wcm/connect/dteweb/insight/dte-insight-faq [https://perma.cc/8YHG-NPTL].
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consumer-facing analytics and no compatibility with third-party
products.55 Perhaps due to differences across utilities,56 some home
energy-monitoring products opt for more direct approaches to
measurement. One product uses the infrared port found on most smart
meters to avoid any radio-connectivity issues.57 Another requires an
electrician to install clamps on the power mains, bypassing the meter
entirely.58
Despite some variability in consumer friendliness, smart meters are
extremely helpful for utilities. Take the basic issue of service outages.
Prior to the installation of smart meters, utilities only knew where an
outage occurred in their service territory when a customer called to report
it59—remember that the meters themselves had no means of reporting
back to the utility. But the smart grid allows utilities to directly detect
when and where outages are occurring, which also gives them a head start

55. See Mark Harrington, Amid a Sea of Smart Meters, New Time-of-Use Rates Also Are
Coming, NEWSDAY, https://www.newsday.com/long-island/pseg-smart-meters-rates-1.30602551
[https://perma.cc/B55V-S7WV] (last updated May 5, 2019, 11:08 PM) (describing the
introduction of time-of-use rates by PSEG Long Island); Dispelling the Myths and Misconceptions
of Smart Meters, PSEG LONG ISLAND, https://www.psegliny.com/myaccount/serviceand
rates/smartmeter/faq [https://perma.cc/2625-PBN8] (promising that the utility will not even view
individual-level data). A recent report by ACEEE indicates that most utilities with smart meters
installed provide AMI data to customers via a website and mobile device app. AM. COUNCIL FOR
AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., LEVERAGING ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE TO SAVE
ENERGY 12 (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/research
reports/u2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/93DQ-M6VX].
56. Apparently, utilities have often created unintentional technological barriers to
information sharing. See, e.g., Jeff St. John, Texas Takes a Big Step in Improving Access to Smart
Meter Data, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/
read/texas-smart-meter-data-access#gs.atx1d3 [https://perma.cc/ADD8-GJ8D].
57. This product is Energy Cloud by Blue Line Innovations. See Easy Do-It-Yourself
Installation, BLUE LINE INNOVATIONS, https://www.bluelineinnovations.com/diy-details
[https://perma.cc/F5RW-L8MS] (stating that the meter sensor slides over the meter and uses the
customer’s home network to transmit data). It claims to be compatible with the vast majority of
smart meter types, but no statistics are available. See Compatible Meters, BLUE LINE
INNOVATIONS, https://www.bluelineinnovations.com/compatibility-window [https://perma.cc/
FB78-GFNT].
58. How It Works., SENSE, https://sense.com/product-page [https://perma.cc/2HEFSAZW]. Efficiency Vermont has partnered with the company, Sense, to help homeowners save
energy by identifying individual device energy usage within the home. Efficiency Vermont and
Sense Conduct Pilot Study of Advanced Home Energy Monitoring, EFFICIENCY VERMONT (July
24, 2018), https://www.efficiencyvermont.com/news-blog/news/efficiency-vermont-and-senseconduct-pilot-study-of-advanced-home-energy-monitoring [https://perma.cc/AWG9-XTK7].
59. Smart Meters Can Reduce Power Outages and Restoration Time, NAT’L ELEC. MFRS.
ASS’N, https://www.nema.org/Storm-Disaster-Recovery/Smart-Grid-Solutions/Pages/Smart-MetersCan-Reduce-Power-Outages-and-Restoration-Time.aspx [https://perma.cc/8NSZ-4PMZ].
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in diagnosing why the outage is occurring.60 AMIs provide “situational
awareness” to utilities in this way, enabling them to send crews to the
highest priority areas during outages and understand what percentage of
their service territory is without power.61 Smart meters also provide
utilities with the ability to remotely switch the power supply on or off,
which is critical during storms and other natural disasters.62
The detailed data provided by smart meters gives utilities almost realtime information on electricity demand, which can enable the utility to
better generate the appropriate amount of electricity to meet consumer
demand for a specific time of day.63 This allows for better calibration of
production and minimizes surplus electricity.64 Smart meters can also
provide residential and business users real-time information about
electricity cost to, hopefully, encourage them to change their
60. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INCREASING ELECTRIC
GRID RESILIENCE TO WEATHER OUTAGES 10–11 (2013) (describing how the smart grid reduced
power-outage duration in the wake of Superstorm Sandy and Hurricane Irene); How The Smart
Grid Keeps Your Power On, SMART ENERGY CONSUMER COLLABORATIVE, http://www.whatis
smartgrid.org/smart-grid-101/fact-sheets/how-the-smart-grid-keeps-your-power-on [https://
perma.cc/UGL7-REXE]; Smart Meters Can Reduce Power Outages and Restoration Time, supra
note 59.
61. Jouni Peppanen et al., Leveraging AMI Data for Distribution System Model Calibration
and Situational Awareness, 6 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID 2050, 2056 (2015).
Situational awareness can provide tangible and monetary improvements through
increased reliability. Advanced systems provide immediate alerts and earlywarning detection of issues. Locations of outages along with potential feeder
reconfigurations can be directly known so that crews can be dispatched as
efficiently as possible. Situational awareness also provides visualization and
detection of problem areas, such as overloaded lines or inefficient buildings.
See also COOPER, supra 47, at 3 (describing how smart meter technology allows providers to
restore power quickly and efficiently).
62. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 900; Kim Zetter, Security Pros Question Deployment of
Smart Meters, WIRED (Mar. 4, 2010, 6:07 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/03/smart-gridsdone-smartly/ [https://perma.cc/E375-MNR8] (“Digital smart meters have an electronic
disconnect switch that allows the utility company to shut down electricity remotely.”).
63. See Brendan Cook et al., The Smart Meter and a Smarter Consumer: Quantifying the
Benefits of Smart Meter Implementation in the United States, CHEMISTRY CENT. J., Apr. 2012, at
1, 5 (“A primary goal of smart meter implementation is to better know the demand of every
consumer, in order to adapt the supply of electricity. The introduction of various informatics
devices has made this possible.”); The Smart Home, supra note 47 (“The Smart Grid, with its
System of controls and smart meters, will help to effectively connect all these mini-power
generating systems to the grid, to provide data about their operation to utilities and owners, and
to know what surplus energy is feeding back into the grid versus being used on site.”).
64. See Harvey, supra note 10, at 2073–74 (“Enhanced monitoring of the location and
timing of electricity needs will also mean utilities will be able to better reduce line loss—energy
lost in transmission or distribution—and avoid the need for excess generation to ensure demand
is met.”); Megan McLean, Note, How Smart is Too Smart?: How Privacy Concerns Threaten
Modern Energy Infrastructure, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 879, 884 (2016).
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consumption patterns.65 The goal is for consumers to shift some of the
electricity usage to earlier or later times in the day to reduce the need to
bring more power plants online at peak usage, reducing the cost of
providing the power.66
For those consumers who wish to understand their energy usage, there
are two basic approaches. First, many utilities enable their customers to
view their energy usage on the utility website.67 The clarity and detail of
these utility-provided portals tend to vary greatly.68 Second, third-party
companies are starting to develop platforms for consumers to see and
manage their electricity usage at home through in-home displays and
home energy-management systems.69 These home systems allow
consumers to manage their energy consumption independently and
understand whether peak demand is occurring at any given time.70
The idea of having individual consumers shift their behavior in
response to minute-by-minute changes in electricity pricing sounds
somewhat fanciful; few consumers are likely to pay this much attention
to their electricity-consumption decisions.71 But this is where smart
65. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 901 (“A smart meter could also show the real-time price
of electricity, and help consumers save money. Demand for electricity peaks at various times
during the typical day. Using a smart meter, a consumer could time shift and lower her electricity
usage when demand and prices are high.”); C. Aswin Raj et al., Smart Meter Based on Real Time
Pricing, 21 PROCEDIA TECH. 120, 120, 124 (2015).
66. Luis I. Minchala-Avila et al., Design and Implementation of a Smart Meter with
Demand Response Capabilities, 103 ENERGY PROCEDIA 195, 195 (2016) (“Peak load reduction
through an interactive reaction of the loads installed at the customer premises, e.g. turn on
schedulable loads when cheap generation is available, increases network reliability and produce
significant economic savings to the utility and the customers.”).
67. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERVAL DATA AND THEIR POTENTIAL
APPLICATION TO RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY END-USE MODELING 7 (2015) (describing the Green
Button Initiative).
68. See id. at 22.
69. Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
161, 166–67 (2011). One example of this product is the Energy Cloud by Blue Line Innovations.
It reads a smart meter via the meter’s infrared port. See Easy Do-It-Yourself Installation, supra
note 57. It claims to be compatible with the vast majority of smart meter types, but no statistics
are available. See Compatible Meters, supra note 57. Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), the utility
serving the Chicago metro area provides a customer guide for linking in-home displays to the
ComEd smart meter. See Smart Meter Connected Devices Service: Customer Guide, COMED,
https://www.comed.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/SmartEnergy/SMCD_CustomerGuide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TYU-Y5QW]. The service allows customers “to receive energy usage and
estimated cost information from ComEd through a smart device that is wirelessly connected with
the smart meter” on the home. Id.
70. A.F.A. Aziz et al., Artificial Intelligent Meter Development Based on Advanced
Metering Infrastructure Technology, 27 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 191, 195
(2013).
71. See Chris Mooney, Why 50 Million Smart Meters Still Haven’t Fixed America’s Energy
Habits, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015, 1:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
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homes and smart devices can play a critical role. What if your thermostat
knew it was cheaper to cool down your home in the morning as opposed
to the afternoon, when it is hotter and more air-conditioning units are
running?72 Or what if your dishwasher knew it would be cheaper to run
now as opposed to in an hour?73 Much power is consumed by these kinds
of consumer appliances, and even now product manufacturers are trying
to integrate them with smart home hubs and smart meters.74 Smart home
hubs and smart appliances can respond to signals from utilities.75 In fact,
“[t]here is an extensive interest on remote monitoring of [smart meters]
to increase the grid management and metering security.”76 Even if no
consumers ever look at their smart meter data, their homes could learn to
take advantage of the information provided by the meters to save the
homeowners money and the grid electricity.

environment/wp/2015/01/29/americans-are-this-close-to-finally-understanding-their-electricitybills/ [https://perma.cc/8QS2-SEUA] (describing how a lack of transparency inhibits behavioral
change). But see Mikko Tuomisto, Non-Intrusive Appliance Load Monitoring (NIALM) System
with the Possibility for Users to Follow the Consumption of Individual Electricity Appliances from
the Calendar, 5 INT’L J. ENERGY & POWER ENGINEERING 129, 130–31 (2016) (describing a tool
that would allow consumers to help identify unique device activity to better track electricity
consumption in their homes).
72. See, e.g., Ashley Carman, Nest’s Thermostat Will Now Adjust Itself Based on Time-ofUse Rates, VERGE (June 21, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2016/6/
21/11987378/nest-thermostat-update-time-of-savings-save-money [https://perma.cc/K5EB-VFCD]
(“Now the company is launching a ‘Time of Savings’ feature that claims to save homeowners
money by adjusting their house’s temperature based on time-of-use rate plans.”); see also
Thermostat Incentive, COMED, https://www.comed.com/WaysToSave/ForYourHome/Pages/
ThermostatIncentive.aspx [https://perma.cc/LFR3-TW9K] (describing a program based on
automatic time-use adjustment).
73. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 7, at 15–16 (describing how smart devices can allow
for remote control of energy-intensive cycles); The Smart Home, supra note 47 (“Smart
appliances will also be able to respond to signals from your energy provider to avoid using energy
during times of peak demand.”).
74. PETER BRONSKI ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., THE ECONOMICS OF DEMAND
FLEXIBILITY: HOW “FLEXIWATTS” CREATE QUANTIFIABLE VALUE FOR CUSTOMERS AND THE GRID
5 (2015), https://rmi.org/insight/the-economics-of-demand-flexibility-how-flexiwatts-createquantifiable-value-for-customers-and-the-grid/ [https://perma.cc/YY7B-ZSWS] (pointing out
that time shifting on uses such as air conditioning, water heating, and electric-vehicle charging
could meaningfully lower peak usage without harming domestic-device productivity).
75. Minchala-Avila et al., supra note 66, at 196 (“[Smart meters] integrate the ability to
remotely manage loads at the end-user premises by monitoring and controlling the customer’s
devices and appliances.”); The Smart Home, supra note 47 (describing how an energy
management system can be programmed to help limit use during peak periods).
76. Yasin Kabalci, A Survey on Smart Metering and Smart Grid Communication, 57
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 302, 308 (2016).
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To encourage use of these automatic-management features, many
utilities currently offer “demand response” programs,77 which enable
consumers to play a role in balancing the electric grid “by reducing or
shifting their electricity usage” to different times of the day.78 Some
programs utilize pricing information to incentivize their customers to
shift their energy usage themselves, others utilize “direct load control
programs,” which allow the utility to remotely cycle air conditioners,
thermostats, or water heaters on and off during peak periods of demand.79
The majority of existing programs require active customer participation,
but in the future utilities will be able to assist consumers in shifting their
energy usage by utilizing “intelligent load management schemes” that
automatically disconnect loads from power when it is “necessary or
convenient.”80 These “[o]ptimal scheduling strategies” will enable
utilities using home energy management systems to turn on or off home
appliances including air-conditioning units, water heaters, washing
machines and dryers, microwaves, computers, and more.81 While most
appliances in homes today are not yet capable of being remotely
controlled, utilities and manufacturers are working to make appliances
“smart” and able to participate in demand response initiatives.82
77. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & ADVANCED
METERING 21 (2011) (defining “demand response” as “[c]hanges in electric use by demand-side
resources from their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity,
or to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high wholesale
market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized”).
78. Demand Response, OFF. ELECTRICITY, https://www.energy.gov/oe/activities/
technology-development/grid-modernization-and-smart-grid/demand-response [https://perma.cc/
VXB7-EAGW].
79. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 7, at 15 (“Customers received incentives for
allowing utilities to use DLC devices to control various types of appliances and equipment—such
as air conditioners, water heaters, and swimming pool and irrigation pumps—to reduce peak
demands.”); Demand Response, supra note 78; Herman K. Trabish, The New Demand Response
and the Future of the Power Sector, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/the-new-demand-response-and-the-future-of-the-power-sector/512134/ [https://perma.cc/
9W9V-CWVW].
80. Sean Barker et al., SmartCap: Flattening Peak Electricity Demand in Smart Homes,
2012 IEEE INT’L CONF. ON PERVASIVE COMPUTING & COMM. 67, 67; see also Trabish, supra note
79 (“Nearly everything has a chip in it now . . . . If it is controllable, it can help support the grid.”
(quoting Carly Sorrentino, Spokesperson, Advanced Microgrid Sys.)).
81. Hussain Shareef et al., Review on Home Energy Management System Considering
Demand Responses, Smart Technologies, and Intelligent Controllers, 6 IEEE ACCESS 24,498,
24,503–04
(2018),
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8352822
[https://perma.cc/5AL2-4JM5].
82. Barker et al., supra note 80, at 68; see Keith Barry, Whirlpool’s New Connected
Appliances Simplify the Smart Grid, REVIEWED, https://www.reviewed.com/laundry/features/
whirlpools-new-connected-appliances-simplify-the-smart-grid [https://perma.cc/7XYY-QTSD]
(last updated Sept. 12, 2015) (“Appliances equipped with Whirlpool’s 6th Sense Live can
automatically run when power is cheapest.”).
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Finally, smart meters enable the increased use of renewable-energy
and storage technologies on the grid. Historically, the conventional grid
was unidirectional: electricity moved from the power plants outward
through the transmission and distribution system to industrial sites,
commercial businesses, and residential homes.83 This arrangement of the
electric grid was effective until the development of distributed energy
resources (DERs),84 which include renewable sources of power such as
solar panels or wind turbines that are installed at the customer site instead
of the utility plant. The placement of DERs at the “end” of the traditional
electric grid required the development of a system that could move
electricity “bi-directionally,” enabling the DERs to move electricity onto
the grid instead of simply receiving it from the grid.85 Moreover, the
interval-level data that smart meters provide also enables the integration
of DERs onto the grid and may help utilities better “predict the behavior
of customer-sited energy resources so that these resources can be utilized
more efficiently.”86 In the future, smart meters could help utilities decide
whether to bring online a new power plant or instead utilize battery
storage or other DERs located at consumer sites to meet increasing
electricity demands.87
Smart meters already bring clear benefits for both utilities and the
public, and they represent a promising area for consumer participation
and increased efficiency in the future. Overall, the savings that follow
from a better understanding of electricity demand and the potential for
peak load shifting “can significantly reduce national energy use and curb
energy emissions while addressing pressing geopolitical and

83. Kabalci, supra note 76, at 304.
84. See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, UTILITY OF THE FUTURE 2 (2016) (“DERs include demand
response, generation, energy storage, and energy control devices, if they are located and function
at the distribution level.”).
85. Kabalci, supra note 76, at 309 (“One of the most important achievements in smart grid
is AMI system that is used to measure, acquire, and analyze the data about energy consumption
and power quality of each consumer. . . . The bidirectional communication is performed between
utility supplier and consumer to improve maintenance, demand management, and planning
capability of supplier.”).
86. COOPER, supra 47, at 5. Oracle has partnered with EnergyHub to create a product that
will help utilities connect with and potentially control DERs in customer homes in their service
territories. “EnergyHub’s platform gives utilities deep insight and control of these edge-of-grid
assets, allowing the utility to understand where a DER is located on the grid, forecasting the
behavior of that DER, and allowing the utility to manage these devices to provide grid services.”
Stephen Hill, Opower and EnergyHub Form a Smart Partnership, OPOWER BLOG SERIES (Oct.
22, 2019), https://blogs.oracle.com/utilities/opower-and-energyhub-form-a-smart-partnership-v3
[https://perma.cc/CN75-V7TZ].
87. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 7, at 52 (“Looking to the future, AMI can contribute
to advanced concepts like vehicle-to-grid applications where utilities can have access to EV
storage capacity for meeting system needs.”).
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environmental concerns related to energy security and sustainability.”88
But there are also risks associated with this information revolution. Smart
meters generate significant amounts of data on what is occurring within
residential homes, which have privacy implications as technology
continues to progress in this area.
B. Risks Posed by Interval-Level Smart Meter Data
Smart meters record interval-level data on residential electricity
usage, transmit the usage to the utility, and can receive communications
from the smart grid including “real-time energy prices [and] remote
commands” from the utility.89 They can record electricity-usage data at
an extremely precise level, with different systems using hourly, fifteenminute, and five-minute increments.90 “Because of its time granularity,
smart meter data shows not only how much electricity is being used
within a home but also at what time.”91 Prior to the installation of a smart
meter, residential consumers were receiving a single total amount
representing their electricity usage over the length of a month.92 Now,
consumers’ energy usage is tracked in thousands of data points per
month.93 From this highly detailed data, one can even potentially
determine which individual appliances and devices are being used at any
given time within a consumer’s home.94 Previously, energy-consumption
records were not all that useful to others or dangerous to privacy. Now
that has changed.
By looking at smart meter data in short intervals of time, it is possible
to identify which individual appliances are being used at any given time

88. Horne et al., supra note 51, at 65.
89. BRANDON J. MURRILL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42338, SMART METER DATA:
PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY 1 (2012).
90. Klass & Wilson, supra note 12, at 1105 (“Utilities can collect data subhourly (e.g.,
five-, fifteen-, or thirty-minute intervals), hourly, daily, or monthly and choose whether or not to
share it, with whom to share it, and in what format to make it available.”).
91. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation & Privacy International in
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Naperville Smart Meter Awareness & Reversal, supra note 39, at
6–7 (“Thus, smart meter data is both qualitatively and quantitatively different from analog meter
data—shifting from ‘one data point reflecting average monthly use’ to between 750 and 8,640
‘distinct and time-stamped data points per month that reflect actual energy use’ at any given
time.”).
92. See supra notes 37–39.
93. Supra note 51 and accompanying text.
94. MURRILL ET AL., supra note 89, at 1–2; Kabalci, supra note 76, at 309 (“One of the most
important achievements in smart grid is AMI system that is used to measure, acquire, and analyze
the data about energy consumption and power quality of each consumer.”); Eoghan McKenna et
al., Smart Meter Data: Balancing Consumer Privacy Concerns with Legitimate Applications, 41
ENERGY POL’Y 807, 808 (2012) (“The ability to detect specific activities, however, depends on
the time resolution of the consumption data.”).
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because each appliance “generates a unique electric load ‘signature.’”95
The load signatures of appliances are recorded by smart meters and a
consumer’s energy usage over time can allow for analysis of daily load
profiles “due to spikes corresponding to the switching on and off [of]
electrical appliances such as a cooker, kettle, iron, microwave, washing
machine[,] etc.”96 This kind of individual appliance information can
reveal consumers’ “daily schedules (including times when they are at or
away from home or asleep), whether their homes are equipped with alarm
systems, whether they own expensive electronic equipment such as
plasma TVs, and whether they use certain types of medical equipment.”97
Moreover, more appliance manufacturers are starting to make smart
appliances—those that are able to connect to and communicate with
smart meters.98 Currently, this represents only a moderate threat to
privacy because though overall energy-usage data already reveals much,
disaggregation of the data to reveal everything is still difficult. In the
future though, there will be an even greater threat because smart network
integration will make it much easier to disaggregate individual appliances
from the overall load.

95. MURRILL ET AL., supra note 89, at 4.
96. GRZEGORZ DUDEK ET AL., ANALYSIS OF SMART METER DATA FOR ELECTRICITY
CONSUMERS (2018) (“Load density profiles inform about the distribution of the customer load in
a given time period. They can be used for comparison the variability of the consumer in different
period of the year or in different days of the week. We can also compare different customers using
their density profiles.”).
97. MURRILL ET AL., supra note 89, at 4 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DATA ACCESS AND
PRIVACY ISSUES RELATED TO SMART GRID TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2010)).
98. Balough, supra note 69, at 166 (“The appliances continually send their energy usage,
labeled as consumed by that appliance, to the smart meter. The smart meter reads that
communication from all smart appliances and can generate a load signature for each home.”).
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Figure 1: A Household’s Power Demand as Measured with
Smart Meter Data99

Figure 2: A Household’s Power Demand Disaggregated into
Appliances100

99. Oliver Parson, Unsupervised Training Methods for Non-Intrusive Appliance Load
Monitoring from Smart Meter Data 63 fig.6.1(a) (Apr. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Southampton), https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/364263/1/Parson-thesis.pdf [https://
perma.cc/35P3-NVVY].
100. Oliver Parson, PhD Work, http://www.oliverparson.co.uk/phd-work [https://perma
.cc/R4V9-LMY5] (last updated Jan. 9, 2014, 6:53 AM). This Figure was generated using hidden
Markov modeling to identify individual devices from nonintrusive load monitoring. See Parson
et al., supra note 8, at 4, for more information on this process.
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The interconnectedness of smart meters and smart devices creates an
opportunity for increased insight and efficiency.101 In addition to
appliance manufacturers working to develop smart appliances that will
interface with smart meters, other companies such as Google, General
Electric, and Cisco are also working to create products that will help
consumers better analyze their smart meter data and energy
consumption.102 All of these developments are occurring concurrently
with the development of smart speakers, smart digital assistants, and
other smart devices in the home that can be connected to or integrated
with the home energy management system.103 Google, Apple, and
Amazon are also partnering with other companies to link their voiceoperated products with the smart-appliance ecosystems, which currently
includes home assistants, smart TVs, smart speakers, smart lights, and
smart thermostats.104 As it stands, “[a]bout 60% of Amazon Echo and
Google Home users have at least one household accessory, such as a
thermostat, security system, or appliance, connected to them,”105 and
these companies are working to achieve ever-greater levels of integration
across their smart device product lines.106 Linking all of this consumer
101. Shareef et al., supra note 81, at 24,501.
Several enabling smart technologies result in the integration of intelligent [home
energy management systems] with various functions inside homes, such as
automatic control, connection to the utility by a smart meter, and minimized
energy consumption. With smart technologies, customers can control household
appliances, optimize electricity consumption, and set a schedule for household
appliances during critical peak hours based on the DR signals. (footnote omitted).
See supra note 54 (describing an Ohio utility’s app that leverages interconnectivity for energy
management and a similar Detroit program). The companies Bidgely and EnergyHub are
partnering to disaggregate home energy data for more than fifteen home energy device brands.
This will allow them to provide customized household and appliance-level data for each home.
Julian Spector, Bidgely and EnergyHub Team Up to Combine Home Energy Data with Controls,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/bidgelyand-energyhub-team-up-to-combine-home-energy-data-with-controls [https://perma.cc/T79QZ8ER].
102. Harvey, supra note 10, at 2074.
103. See Allegra Bianchini, Note, Always On, Always Listening: Navigating Fourth
Amendment Rights in a Smart Home, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1, 6–7 (2018)
(“Integration to control lightbulbs, smart meters, and phone apps, like Uber, allows nearly
complete virtual control of a user’s home, and the possibility of more capabilities is limited only
by programmers’ imaginations.” (footnote omitted)).
104. Brian Dumaine, It Might Get Loud: Inside Silicon Valley’s Battle to Own Voice Tech,
FORTUNE (Oct. 24, 2018), http://fortune.com/longform/amazon-google-apple-voice-recognition/
[https://perma.cc/28KW-NXZK].
105. Id.
106. Apple, Amazon, and Google are partnering to create a single standard for smart-home
products. This will enable more connections between smart devices such as lights, thermostats,
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data to the smart meter installed in the home would basically invite these
companies to sit in your home and to watch, listen, and record everything
that you do. And as more utilities partner with tech companies to facilitate
the connection between these devices, the higher the risk that consumer
energy-consumption data will be easily accessed and sold.
Though this fully “smart home” may be far off in the future, these tech
companies are already looking for ways to expand their internetconnected devices to attain information on consumers’ personal energy
use in the home.107 Google already has partnerships with utilities and
power providers in Illinois, California, and Texas, while Amazon has
partnered with EDF Energy in the United Kingdom and Arcadia Power
in the United States to provide a bundle of home devices that enable better
energy management.108 The movement of tech companies in the
consumer-energy space represents an area of heightened privacy risks.
As of today, utilities are the primary recipient of smart meter data, but
the amount and kind of information now collected will be useful to many
other parties.109 Moreover, with the continued development of the smart
grid and greater emphasis on energy-efficiency programs at the customer
level, utilities will likely struggle to decide which third-party vendors
should have access to the smart meter data.110 Third-party vendors are
already seeking access to this data to help them identify potential
customers, learn which products are used most in a home, and market

and other electronic devices in the home. Ben Gilbert, In a Rare Move, Apple, Amazon, and
Google Just Announced a Major Partnership, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-amazon-google-partner-on-smart-home-tech-2019-12
[https://perma.cc/CR7A-YD2X].
107. See Bradley Olson, Google, Amazon Seek Foothold in Electricity as Home Automation
Grows, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2019, 6:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/google-amazonseek-foothold-in-electricity-as-home-automation-grows-11548604800 [https://perma.cc/G3WJPJFR].
108. Id.; see EDF Energy Launches Voice Controlled Energy Accounts with Amazon Alexa,
EE ONLINE (Sept. 15, 2016), https://electricenergyonline.com/article/organization/28120/
596851/EDF-Energy-launches-voice-controlled-energy-accounts-with-Amazon-Alexa.htm
[https://perma.cc/VB4Z-BLX6] (“EDF Energy’s collaboration with Amazon is part of the
company’s commitment to making energy easy and putting customers in control through
connected home technologies and other innovative products and services, such as its smart
thermostat HeatSmart, and the Show Me Your Bill functionality in its app.”).
109. John R. Forbush, Comment, Regulating the Use and Sharing of Energy Consumption
Data: Assessing California’s SB 1476 Smart Meter Privacy Statute, 75 ALB. L. REV. 341, 342
(2012) (“The potential for utilities and other vendors to collect and aggregate energy consumption
data from individual homes and businesses raises significant questions about the access, use, and
ownership of energy consumption information.”).
110. Balough, supra note 69, at 169 (“Companies that manufacturer [sic] home [energy
management systems] and in-home display systems are actively marketing their products to
utilities for distribution to the electric company’s residential customers.”).
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their products to targeted groups of people.111 These companies could
also help develop interfaces for consumers to better understand and
manage their energy consumption. “Because myriad other systems that
will interact with smart meters have yet to be designed, one cannot fully
predict the types and amounts of personally identifiable information that
will be monitored or collected.”112
Law enforcement agencies will also be interested in accessing this
data and there is at least one case where a police department accessed
smart meter data following a murder.113 In future cases, electricityconsumption data can be expected to be even more indicative of activities
occurring in the home. The problem facing consumers now is
“[i]nformation that previously required surveillance and constant
monitoring, such as when users are home, their day-to-day schedules,
which room of the house they are in at what time, and how often they use
certain appliances and security, [will] now [be] conveniently logged into
a record.”114 Both third-party companies and law enforcement agencies
will be particularly motivated to access that record to attain more
information about the consumers and their homes.
As this Part has demonstrated, smart grid developments can help
consumers reduce their energy consumption and make the electric grid
more efficient. But smart meters, working in conjunction with smart
appliances and other smart devices in the home, convey a significant
amount of private consumer data to utilities and potentially to their
energy efficiency partners. Instead of gathering one data point on energy
consumption per month, utilities are now gathering thousands of data
points from a consumer’s home, which can expose a wide variety of
otherwise private activities.
II. PRIVACY PROTECTIONS AND THE EVOLVING MODERN HOME
This Part uses the lens of Fourth Amendment law to analyze the
privacy implications of the smart meter revolution. It begins by analyzing
the challenges of extending privacy protection to information that is
necessarily shared with third parties and the role of the home as a
constitutional trump card in the Fourth Amendment analysis. It then
applies the traditional Fourth Amendment tests to the problem of smart
111. See Harvey, supra note 10, at 2079 (“Third-party researchers and companies are seeking
access to this data in order to identify customers, enhance product design, and conduct more indepth analysis of energy consumption. For example, a company could use AMI data to identify
potential customers that could benefit from energy efficiency upgrades. That company could then
market products and services tailored specifically for those individual customers.” (footnote
omitted)).
112. Balough, supra note 69, at 167.
113. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
114. Bianchini, supra note 103, at 7.
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meters, ultimately concluding that the use of private smart meter data for
law enforcement purposes does implicate Fourth Amendment
protections. It closes by using information-privacy cases of Whalen v.
Roe and NASA v. Nelson to consider the constitutional reasonableness of
smart meter data collection for non-law enforcement purposes, such as
when the government is acting in the role of a public utility.
Smart meters highlight a growing tension in this area. The normal
Fourth Amendment intuition is that you, as an individual, have no
expectation of privacy in the records of companies with which you do
business.115 Yet at the same time, a growing body of Fourth Amendment
case law has softened previously fixed antiprivacy rules in the face of
advancing technology and the increasing ease with which a significant
amount of intimate data can be collected.116 And, with smart meters, there
is the additional complication of the role of the home, which is
traditionally the most protected physical location for Fourth Amendment
purposes.117 Though this Article’s ultimate focus is broader than
government information gathering, the standards of the Fourth
Amendment help illuminate the fundamental challenge of smart meter—
and general smart home—technology.
An important nuance in the energy domain is the multiple roles that
the government may play. In the United States, there are both privately
owned utilities, which include investor-owned utilities and rural electriccooperative associations, and publicly owned utilities, which include
federal power systems such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and public
power systems such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power.118 The Fourth Amendment only applies directly to publicly
owned utilities, which have been estimated to make up about 67% of the
utilities in the United States but only serve about 15% of electric
customers.119 Private investor-owned utilities are primarily regulated by

115. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018).
116. See generally, e.g., id. (protecting cell phone location records); Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373 (2014) (protecting cell phones from warrantless searches); United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400 (2012) (prohibiting the installation of a GPS tracker on a private vehicle).
117. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: Reflections on the Home, the
Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 175, 175–76 (2002).
118. See EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 71–72; Differences Between Publicly and InvestorOwned Utilities, CAL. ENERGY COMMISSION, https://ww2.energy.ca.gov/pou_reporting/back
ground/difference_pou_iou.html [https://perma.cc/52W2-XPRF].
119. See Stats and Facts, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, https://www.publicpower.org/publicpower/stats-and-facts [https://perma.cc/6BY8-EVZG]; Today in Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40913 [https://perma
.cc/ZD77-8AGL].
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state public-utility commissions, but privacy regulations can vary
dramatically state by state.120
Depending on where one lives, therefore, one’s energy provider might
be a government entity—a public or semi-public utility—or a private
corporation. If the utility is a private company, then the Fourth
Amendment question is whether you have an expectation of privacy in
that company’s records. This implicates the “third-party doctrine.” If the
utility is public, however, then two separate questions arise: First,
whether the government can insist on the installation of a smart meter on
a home—the meter itself could be a Fourth Amendment search—and,
second, whether there is a Fourth Amendment problem with the “utility”
portion of the government sharing information with the “law
enforcement” portion of the government. We believe that the ultimate
Fourth Amendment answer should be the same for public and private
utilities—that people do have an expectation of privacy in energy-usage
records and that the government should be required to obtain a warrant if
it wishes to access those records for law enforcement purposes. But we
shall begin with the private-utility case before complicating our analysis
by considering the implications of a public utility.
A. The Third-Party Doctrine
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the people’s right to be free from
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”121 The current test for whether a
particular investigative action implicates the Fourth Amendment is given
in Justice John Harlan’s concurrence to Katz v. United States.122 This test
requires that the person being searched by the police have a subjective
expectation of privacy in the place or thing being searched and that this
expectation be objectively reasonable.123 Once it is determined that a
search implicates the Fourth Amendment, a court then must determine if
the search or seizure is itself reasonable, thus reasonableness enters the
analysis twice.124 In the law enforcement context, the search of a private
space for law enforcement purposes is reasonable if the government agent
has a warrant from an independent magistrate or if one of the numerous
exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.125
The Fourth Amendment has historically granted no protection for
information that people voluntarily share with third parties, including not
only friends but also private companies.126 The government’s acquisition
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See, e.g., Differences Between Publicly and Investor-Owned Utilities, supra note 118.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See id. at 361.
See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004).
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
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of this information is not considered a “search” for Fourth Amendment
purposes and therefore courts do not even reach the question of whether
the acquisition is reasonable; the information is treated as having been
completely nonsecret.127 In its most basic form, this “third-party
doctrine” is unexceptional. Police informants and coconspirators-turnedinformants regularly reveal information to the government that was
entrusted to them by another. In the words of Justice Potter Stewart
writing in the seminal case of Hoffa v. United States,128 “Neither this
Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth
Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”129 Thus,
the law assumes that as soon as you impart a private piece of information
to another, it is no longer considered private information under the Fourth
Amendment.
Though few object to the idea of allowing criminals to betray their
former confederates, support for the third-party doctrine frays
substantially when the same principle is applied to the business records
that law-abiding companies hold on criminal suspects.130 And it is easy
to see why this application is controversial. The doctrine removes from
Fourth Amendment protection huge swathes of otherwise private data
that is collected by private companies on a regular basis. Were the
traditional third-party doctrine to govern smart meter data, then the
government could freely obtain this type of data from private utilities
without a warrant.
The origins of the business-records portion of the third-party doctrine
can be found in two cases where the Supreme Court found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information recorded and stored by a private
company. First, the Court in United States v. Miller131 held that there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in financial documents held by a
bank.132 “All of the documents obtained, including financial statements
and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business.”133 The depositors, the Court said, assume the risk that the bank
127. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
128. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
129. Id. at 302; see also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting in regards only to electronic eavesdropping) (“The risk of being overheard by an
eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer . . . is probably inherent in the conditions of human
society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak.”).
130. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009)
(describing the third-party doctrine as “the Lochner of search and seizure law, widely criticized
as profoundly misguided” (footnote omitted)).
131. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
132. See id. at 440–42.
133. Id. at 442.
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will reveal their affairs to the government upon request.134 The innocent
bank, like the guilty coconspirator, is perfectly free to expose the secrets
of those who trusted it with their private financial information. Similarly,
the Supreme Court found in Smith v. Maryland135 that individuals have
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from their
home telephones and thereby possessed by the telephone companies.136
Again, the Court treated the private company as a potential informer, free
to share its records with the government.137
The timeline of this doctrine is interesting. The original informer cases
were decided in the 1960s, and Smith and Miller are creations of the
1970s. Much has changed since then. The amount and granularity of
personal information that is collected by new forms of technology
provides a significantly more intimate picture of individuals and their
activities than did the technologies and habits of even two decades ago.
The potential applications of the third-party doctrine are enumerable in
modern society, especially with the addition of more devices that are used
on an hourly basis. More and more commercial companies are
recognizing the value in home energy-consumption data as a means of
gathering information about their current and potential customers.
The Supreme Court has not been blind to this digital revolution. The
first truly qualitative shift in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in response to this development came in Riley v.
California,138 which held that a cell phone cannot be searched incident to
arrest absent a warrant or generally recognized exception to the warrant
requirement.139 Existing case law had been read to allow warrantless
searches of any and all physical containers in the arrested persons’
possession—items such as purses, wallets, and briefcases—incident to
arrest.140 So arrested persons could expect a warrantless search of any
personal papers that they were carrying, including opened mail, notes
from old friends, and the like. And, before Riley, federal appellate courts
frequently upheld warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest.141
134. See id. at 443.
135. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
136. Id. at 742.
137. See id. at 744–45.
138. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
139. Id. at 393 (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other
objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”).
140. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (contents of a cigarette pack);
United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1123, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) (billfold and address book);
United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1383–84 (11th Cir. 1982) (wallet); United States v. Lee,
501 F.2d 890, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (purse).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 711–13 (5th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411–12 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60
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In Riley, Chief Justice John Roberts likened the argument that cell
phones were “materially indistinguishable” from briefcases to “saying a
ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the
moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else
justifies lumping them together.”142 Cell phones simply contained too
much information to treat them like physical papers.143 So the Court
fashioned a bright-line rule: police must “get a warrant” to search a cell
phone.144 This represented a substantial shift in Fourth Amendment law,
and it was widely discussed as such in both the scholarly literature and
the popular press.145
The stakes and torches of this digital revolution reached the palaces
of the third-party doctrine just four years later in Carpenter v. United
States. There, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
extends to protect historical cell-site location information (CSLI) records
from cell phones.146 These records are generated every time a cell phone
connects to a cell tower, which most modern devices will attempt to do
several times a minute.147 The data therefore has the potential to represent
a moment-by-moment catalogue of a cell phone user’s movements.148
The police in Carpenter had obtained a court order issued under the
Stored Communications Act to access the CSLI records, but the Court
held that this was insufficient.149 Even though CSLI is contained in the
phone company’s own records, a warrant was required to access it.150
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority in Carpenter noted two distinctions
from prior case law, both important for this Article’s purposes. First, he
explained that the conveyance of location information to cell phone
(5th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809–10 (7th Cir. 2012)
(permitting a limited cell phone search incident to arrest, while reserving the question of whether
a more invasive search would have been permissible without a warrant).
142. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
143. See id. (“Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond
those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”).
144. Id. at 403.
145. See, e.g., Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment
Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1771–74 (2017); Paul Ohm, The Life of Riley (v. California),
48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 133, 134 (2015) (describing Riley as a “significant milestone in
constitutional criminal procedure” and a “privacy opinion for the ages”); Orin Kerr, The Volokh
Conspiracy: The Significance of Riley, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014, 11:56 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/25/the-significance-ofriley/?utm_term=.d867005e9b0b [https://perma.cc/M3TF-W4J3] (“Riley can be fairly read as
saying that computers are a game-changer: We’re now in a ‘digital age,’ and quantity of data and
the ‘qualitatively different’ nature of at least some digital records changes how the Fourth
Amendment should apply.”).
146. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
147. Id. at 2211.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 2221.
150. See id.
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providers was not really “voluntary” because it did not require any
affirmative act on the part of users “beyond powering up”151 and cell
phones are now a ubiquitous part of daily life; carrying one is
“indispensable to participation in modern society.”152 So, in Chief Justice
Roberts’s view, any exposure of information that comes from merely
carrying a phone is not truly voluntary as one cannot dispense with the
“indispensable.”
Second, Chief Justice Roberts placed great importance on the
uniquely revealing nature of historical CSLI. Some forms of data are so
“detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” that additional
protections under the Fourth Amendment are required.153 CSLI has the
potential to reveal many of the privacies of life, including issues of great
personal intimacy.154 He also recognized that accessing a person’s
historic CSLI records presented “even greater privacy concerns” than
prospective GPS monitoring because historical CSLI records give the
government near-perfect location surveillance on a person, subject only
to the five-year retention policies of most wireless carriers.155 Though
CSLI was undoubtedly useful to law enforcement, “this tool risks
Government encroachment of the sort the Framers, ‘after consulting the
lessons of history,’ drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.”156
This holding represented a sharp break from prior third-party doctrine
jurisprudence, a point made vigorously in dissent by Justice Anthony
Kennedy. He pointed out that, whatever the sensitivity of historical
location data, the information at issue was fundamentally in records
owned and controlled by a third party.157 He therefore would have treated
the case as bound squarely by Smith and Miller, precedents that the
majority notably did not overturn.158 He also challenged the notion that

151. Id. at 2220.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 2216–17.
154. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014) (citing United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”).
155. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; see also id. at 2223 (“In light of the deeply revealing
nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic
nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by a third party does not make
it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
156. Id. at 2223 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
157. See id. at 2231 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Cases like this one, where the Government
uses court-approved compulsory process to obtain records owned and controlled by a third party,
are governed by the two majority opinions in Miller and Smith.”).
158. Id.
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CSLI was uniquely revealing.159 A person’s movements are, after all,
generally in public spaces. Financial and telephone records, by contrast,
might reveal more:
What persons purchase and to whom they talk might disclose
how much money they make; the political and religious
organizations to which they donate; whether they have
visited a psychiatrist, plastic surgeon, abortion clinic, or
AIDS treatment center; whether they go to gay bars or
straight ones; and who are their closest friends and family
members.160
This evolution of the third-party doctrine complicates the story for
smart meter data in the hands of private companies. Twenty years ago, it
would have been easy to argue that energy-consumption information,
which is collected by utilities and is an essential part of their operations,
is merely a collection of business records.161 The electricity bill is only
one of many that is paid out of the family checking account, and Miller
teaches that even the totality of the family accounts can be examined
absent a warrant.162 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reached exactly that conclusion on exactly that reasoning as recently as
2012.163 “The records sought here are business records owned and
possessed by [the utility]” and “[the utility’s] business records are no
more inherently personal or private than the bank records in Miller.”164
And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit came to the same
conclusion in 2011.165 In both the Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases, the
underlying investigation was drug related.166
But then the world changed. Part of that change is the introduction of
smart meters. Suddenly they generate information hour by hour or minute
by minute rather than month by month. And part of the change is in the
legal rule. After Carpenter, the question is whether smart meter data is
sufficiently involuntarily conveyed, sufficiently revealing, and
159. See id. at 2234 (“But the Court does not explain what makes something a distinct
category of information.”).
160. Id. at 2232.
161. See State v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247, 252 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (finding no expectation of
privacy in utility records under federal or state constitutions).
162. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–40 (1976).
163. See United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012).
164. Id.
165. See United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1111–12 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Similarly,
when [McIntyre] used power in his home, he voluntarily conveyed that information to [Cedar–
Knox Public Power District].” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 434 F.
Supp. 2d 974, 979 (D. Or. 2006))).
166. See Golden Valley, 689 F.3d at 1111; McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1110.
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sufficiently unique to the new digital world to warrant becoming the
second exception to the third-party doctrine.
B. Electronic Infiltration of the Home
When considering whether smart meter data is sufficiently special to
qualify for an exception to the third-party doctrine, we must consider the
role of the home in modern Fourth Amendment law. Despite the Supreme
Court’s assertion in Katz that “the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places,”167 emphasis has often been placed on the home. The home
has been viewed as an especially private space by American privacy law
since its founding. The Fourth Amendment was in part a response to
British excesses such as “general warrants” and “writs of assistance” in
the colonies,168 which allowed people and their homes to be searched
without cause to believe they had committed an offense. Forced entry into
a home and “rummaging around inside were understood as the
paradigmatic examples of ‘searches.’”169
This focus on location and, particularly, on the home has caused
complications in several cases involving technological surveillance. In
two cases from the 1980s, police officers installed electronic trackers
(beepers) in containers of chemicals used in the production and
processing of illegal drugs.170 Informants then sold those containers to
suspected drug dealers so that the government could trace where the
suspects had established their drug labs.171 In the first case, United States
v. Knotts,172 the officers tracked the property when it was in the suspect’s
car traveling over public roads.173 Ultimately, the container came to rest
in a secluded cabin, which the police then raided.174 In the second case,
United States v. Karo,175 the officers tracked the container through three
houses and two storage facilities.176
167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
168. History and Scope of the Amendment: Search and Seizure: Fourth Amendment, JUSTIA,
https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-04/01-search-and-seizure.html [https://perma.
cc/Z7WX-RW84] (“In order to enforce the revenue laws, English authorities made use of writs
of assistance, which were general warrants authorizing the bearer to enter any house or other place
to search for and seize ‘prohibited and uncustomed’ goods, and commanding all subjects to assist
in these endeavors.”).
169. Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV.
67, 72.
170. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 277–78 (1983).
171. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 708; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
172. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
173. Id. at 281.
174. Id. at 278–79.
175. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
176. Id. at 708–09.
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In Knotts, the beeper tracking did not present a Fourth Amendment
problem.177 Though the final destination was on private property, the
beeper’s transit occurred entirely over public roads and so, to the Court,
was therefore exposed to public view.178 The use of the beeper to track
the location had been practically necessary—the police had difficulty
monitoring the suspect’s car given his “evasive maneuvers”—but there
was no inherent reason why naked-eye surveillance could not have
obtained the same information.179 The Court later found distinguishable
facts in Karo, however. There, the police repeatedly used the beeper to
determine whether the incriminating container was still present in a
private residence, a fact that they were having great difficulty otherwise
observing.180 Though “[t]he monitoring of an electronic device such as a
beeper is, of course, less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does
reveal a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the
Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have
otherwise obtained without a warrant.”181
This seems a somewhat curious distinction. One leaves a private
residence on public roads, so the question of whether one is still in a house
can generally be answered by watching the outside. But the Court was
balancing two strong intuitions. The first is that public roads are generally
public.182 The second is plainly expressed in Karo: “At the risk of
belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not
authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society
is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”183 And, several pages later, the
Court noted that “[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has been
withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth
Amendment oversight.”184
The very act of carrying the electronic surveillance device over the
threshold into a private building, then, changes the character of its use.
Checking the beeper before the container is carried into a building is
perfectly permissible; you are tracking an object in public spaces. But,
checking the beeper after to determine if it is still in the building is not
permissible; you are monitoring a private space. A space so private, in
fact, that it is “obvious” that the Fourth Amendment protects it.
177. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
178. Id. at 281–82.
179. Id. at 278, 285.
180. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–15.
181. Id. at 715.
182. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”).
183. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 716.
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The Supreme Court similarly recognized the importance of protecting
homes from enhanced surveillance made possible by advancing
technology in Kyllo v. United States.185 There the Court held that the
government cannot use a thermal imager outside of a home to explore
what is happening inside the home because doing so would leave
homeowners “at the mercy of advancing technology.”186 At the time of
the Court’s decision, thermal imagers were not widely used by the
public.187 The Court found that the simple act of collecting thermal
images of the home while standing outside of it constituted a search under
the Fourth Amendment even if the person observing the home did not
enter the property.188
The technology used in Kyllo was fairly primitive.189 “The scan
showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner’s home
were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially
warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex.”190 This was useful for
detecting use of halide lights in a marijuana farm but did not reveal much
about the other activities of the home’s occupants.191 Nevertheless, the
Court looked ahead at technologies then being developed which might
allow thermal imaging “through-the-wall” and would therefore reveal the
movements of people inside a house.192 Thinking of what technology
would potentially soon enable substantially eased the majority’s decision.
C. The Fourth Amendment and Private Smart Meter Data
The forward-looking concern evident in Kyllo returns us to smart
meters. First consider the common case where a private utility has
information about electricity consumption and the government wants to
obtain that information for law enforcement purposes. As discussed in
Part I, smart meters can convey a significant amount of information about
the activities that occur within a home if the data is properly
disaggregated. “Granular AMI data presents a potential new tool for law
enforcement to investigate a much broader set of crimes or even track
people’s whereabouts.”193 Even given the current state of the technology,
185. 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001).
186. Id.
187. See id. at 40. The holding seemed to rest primarily on the public’s access to advanced
technology but also recognized the importance of protecting the home. Id. (“Where, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”).
188. See id.
189. See id. at 36 (“[T]he technology used in the present case was relatively crude . . . .”).
190. Id. at 30.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 36.
193. Harvey, supra note 10, at 2082.
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it is already possible to tell a fair amount about household occupancy
patterns, and tech companies are working hard to connect smart devices
together.194 As technology advances and more devices are directly linked
to smart meters, the ability of utilities and potentially other companies to
deduce a family’s behaviors in the home will only increase. As one writer
put it, “[T]he digitization of just about everything is not just possible but
likely, and that now is the time to be freaking out about the dangers.”195
The central tenet in Fourth Amendment law is “the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
government intrusion.”196 A person’s expectation of privacy is highest in
the home, but smart meters risk exposing intimate details of daily life
simply by gathering energy-consumption data in small intervals of time.
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court started in the right direction by stating that
“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a
search.”197 Noting that “the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the
entrance to the house,’” the Court reaffirmed that line by requiring a
“clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a
warrant.”198
In one sense, smart meters fit well within the bounds of Kyllo; they
are a new technology that allows for the cataloging and potential
surveillance of intimate details within the home. And, unlike Kyllo, the
privacy-penetrating possibilities of this technology are already realized.
Even current smart meter data tells you quite a lot about a household.199
Kyllo, however, emphasized that the technology in question was not in
“general public use,”200 and smart meters are increasingly common by
contrast. Utilities often either mandate smart meter installation or make
it quite difficult to opt out of it, so the share of customers using smart
meters can only be expected to increase.201 But as the near-compulsory
194. Farhad Manjoo, A Future Where Everything Becomes a Computer Is as Creepy as You
Feared, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/technology/futureinternet-of-things.html?emc=edit_nn_20181011&nl=morning-briefing&nlid=85811686201810
11&te=1 [https://perma.cc/Q2RF-UYFA] (“Cars, door locks, contact lenses, clothes, toasters,
refrigerators, industrial robots, fish tanks, sex toys, light bulbs, toothbrushes, motorcycle
helmets—these and other everyday objects are all on the menu for getting ‘smart.’”).
195. Id.
196. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
197. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman,
365 U.S. at 512).
198. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
199. See supra Part I.
200. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
201. Duarte, supra note 14, at 1154 (“In many places, smart meter adoption is all but
compulsory. Utility companies typically inform the consumer that a smart meter will be installed
and then send an employee to install the meter.”).
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nature of smart meter installation brings this issue somewhat away from
Kyllo, it drops it squarely into the bounds of Carpenter.
For many in the United States, smart meters are installed as part of
mandatory utility upgrades.202 Though some states require that utilities
allow customers to “opt out” of smart meter installation, the utilities can
and do charge one-time fees or monthly fees that can be prohibitively
expensive.203 Some utilities, such as Commonwealth Edison (ComEd),
which serves the greater Chicago area, do not allow for permanent opt
outs and only permits consumers to pay to delay the installation of the
smart meter.204 Moreover, when consumers move residences or purchase
new homes, it is unlikely that they will reach out to the utility to have an
already-installed smart meter removed, and many utilities would charge
consumers to have the meters switched out.205 Further, consumers are
often unable to switch their electricity provider due to the regional
monopoly structure of public utilities in much of the United States.206
Many electricity customers are “captive customers” and must use the
public utility in their geographic area or go without electricity, which is
not really an option in the twenty-first century.207
Carpenter does not lay out a clear test for when to look beyond the
third-party doctrine and grant Fourth Amendment protection to an
individual’s personal data. Orin Kerr, the year after Carpenter,
understood it as proposing a three-step test.208 First, the business records
in question must be new to the “digital age.”209 Second, the records must
202. See id. at 1153–54.
203. Smart Meter Opt-Out Options and Fees, ELECTRONIC SILENT SPRING,
http://www.electronicsilentspring.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/SMART-METER-OPTOUT-OPTIONS-AND-FEES-by-STATE.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU2A-5AZY] (last updated Nov.
6, 2016) (explaining, for example, in California, Sacramento consumers must pay a one-time fee
of $127 in addition to $14 per month to have their analog meter read by the utility company).
204. See id.
205. See W. MONROE PARTNERS, AMI OPT-OUT: POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND IMPACTS ON
BUSINESS CASES (2015), https://www.westmonroepartners.com/-/media/Files/White-Papers/
West-Monroe-Partners-AMI-Opt-Out-White-Paper-62012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H4G-6ZNW]
(demonstrating that there are many different ways that utilities provide for customers to opt out
including charging customers a monthly fee for continued use of their analog meter); Smart Meter
Opt-Out Options and Fees, supra note 203 (illustrating that several utilities, including Duke
Energy Ohio, charge money for replacing the smart meter with an analog meter and then also
charge for monthly analog meter readings).
206. See David Roberts, Power Utilities Are Built for the 20th Century. That’s Why They’re
Flailing in the 21st., VOX (Sept. 9, 2015, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/9/9/9287719/
utilities-monopoly [https://perma.cc/9JKB-SNP5].
207. See id.
208. Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter (USC Law Legal Studies, Working Paper No.
18-29, 2018) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301257 [https://perma.cc/2VKDA2E9].
209. See id.
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be created without “meaningful voluntary choice.”210 And, third, “the
records must tend to reveal ‘the privacies of life.’”211 Steps two and three
of Kerr’s framework appear to be inherent in the language of Carpenter;
Chief Justice Roberts spent a great deal of time discussing voluntariness
and exposure risk.212 And, on these steps, smart meters would likely
trigger Fourth Amendment protection. If going without a cell phone is
not considered a viable way of avoiding the collection of cell phone
location data, then going without power is not a viable way of avoiding
the collection of smart meter data.213 Similarly, if smart meter data can
show at least “when you are at home and when you are away, when you
lie down and when you rise,”214 that likely qualifies as the “privacies of
life.”
The first requirement—that the records be new to the digital age or
substantially transformed by it—is less clear. Kerr explains this step as
requiring that “[t]he records must be of a kind and nature that generally
could not be collected in a pre-digital age. Pre-digital records and their
modern equivalents are exempt, sort of like a constitutional grandfather
clause.”215 He points to language from Chief Justice Roberts’s majority
opinion referring to “seismic shifts in digital technology that [have] made
possible”216 access to “an entirely different species”217 of data that “do[]
not fit neatly under existing precedents.”218
We fear that one can plausibly argue that almost all types of records
have been substantially transformed by the digital age, making this prong
of the test somewhat useless. Have bank statements been substantially
transformed by the digital age? Arguably, yes. Credit cards as we now
understand them were only introduced in the 1950s.219 Electronic
processing of credit card payments only began in the 1970s.220 It was only
in 1986 that Visa launched an ad campaign trumpeting its evolution
“from a travel and business tool to a card for everyday use.”221 In 1970,
only 16% of families had a bank-type credit card, such as Visa or
210. Id.
211. Id. (manuscript at 22).
212. Id. (manuscript at 20–21).
213. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.
214. Deuteronomy 6:7 (New Revised Standard Version).
215. Kerr, supra note 208 (manuscript at 16).
216. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
217. Id. at 2222.
218. Id. at 2214.
219. See History of Credit Card Processing, BEBUSINESSED.COM, https://bebusinessed.com/
history/history-of-credit-card-processing/ [https://perma.cc/N4SS-WSM6].
220. Id.; see Claire Tsosie, What the First Credit Cards Were Like, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2016,
12:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/clairetsosie/2016/08/29/what-the-first-credit-cardswere-like/#2f051835ec9a [https://perma.cc/LA4Y-WGFN].
221. History of Visa: Our Journey, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/about-visa/our_business/
history-of-visa.html [https://perma.cc/9QDC-PJZR].
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Mastercard.222 By 1998, 68% of families had such a card.223 Nationwide,
a 2017 survey suggested that only a quarter of in-store purchases are now
completed using cash—online purchases are, of course, virtually never
conducted with cash.224 Many law students at Northwestern University
say that they do not even carry cash on a regular basis. This means that
every transaction conducted by these students is directly reflected in the
records of a financial institution. A bank knows when and where they got
their morning coffee, how often they buy lunch rather than pack it, and
which friend they Venmo for their share of the bar tab after class. Miller,
which found no expectation of privacy in bank records, was decided in
1976.225 The world of bank records has substantially changed in the
intervening years.
Bank statements are only one example of how easy it is to argue that
“old” data is now “new” data. Kerr himself makes a similar point about
the metadata of Facebook messages and texts, arguing that Carpenter
requires protection for them despite the clear holding of Smith for
telephone metadata.226 We agree that the Carpenter exception should
apply in this context, but this portion of Kerr’s (and Chief Justice
Roberts’s) test is either so easily satisfied, or so arbitrarily judged, that it
is rarely going to be useful. Nevertheless, smart meters are products of
the digital revolution; they have only been in widespread use for about a
decade.227 And smart meters convey far more information than did the
old analog meters. If one assumes an analog meter is read once a month,
then a digital meter being read every fifteen minutes conveys
approximately 2,880 times as much information.228 If anything is new to
the digital age and transformed by it, these records are.
As with cell-site location data, the collection of smart meter data from
private utilities also likely implicates the Fourth Amendment. The
222. See Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970–2000, FED.
RES. BULL., Sept. 2000, at 623, 625 n.3, 625 fig.1. Technically the names Visa and Mastercard
came later, but the brand predecessors were active in 1970. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Simon, Visa: A
Short History, CREDITCARDS.COM (Mar. 30, 2007), https://www.creditcards.com/ credit-cardnews/history-of-visa-1273.php [https://perma.cc/B88L-2SXL].
223. Durkin, supra note 222.
224. TSYS, 2017 U.S. CONSUMER PAYMENT STUDY 40 (2018). One could conduct online
purchases via cash, check, or money order were one to send payment via mail. This would require
the purchaser to be able to find a stamp, however, and this is well-known to be impossible.
225. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–42 (1976).
226. Kerr, supra note 208 (manuscript at 43–45) (arguing that “[f]or today’s teenagers,
texting is like speaking” due to the sheer number of texts sent in a day).
227. See T. Wang, Number of Electric Smart Meters Installations Deployed in the U.S. from
2007 to 2020 (in million units), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/676472/number-ofsmart-meter-installations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/8NWV-2S5P] (showing that
approximately 7 million smart meters had been installed in the United States by the end of 2007
and that 72 million had been installed by the end of 2016).
228. With four readings per hour in a thirty-day month, there are 2,880 readings per month.
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Supreme Court should follow its reasoning in Kyllo and Carpenter when
considering how to protect smart meter data and should reject the
application of the third-party doctrine to it. Ultimately, the risk posed by
technological advancements and the interconnection of smart meters to
the internet of devices within the home is too high and therefore smart
meter data should be provided additional protections.
D. Reasonableness Balancing and Public Utilities
All Carpenter and Kyllo establish, however, is that the Fourth
Amendment is implicated—that collection of smart meter data is a
search—even if that data is in the hands of a third-party corporation and
not held by the consumer. This still leaves two further questions. First, is
the collection of smart meter data an “unreasonable” search? Recall that
reasonableness enters the Fourth Amendment analysis twice, once in
deciding whether something is a search—reasonable expectations of
privacy—and then in evaluating whether that search is permissible
without a warrant.229 Second, what about when the government is the
utility? Many utilities in the United States are government owned or
operated.230 Is it a Fourth Amendment problem to mandate the collection
of smart meter data?
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court rapidly stepped from the conclusion
that the Fourth Amendment was implicated—that the collection of
several days of historical cell-site data was a search—to the conclusion
that only a warrant based upon probable cause could justify the transfer
of that information to the government for use in a criminal investigation.
“Although the ‘ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a
governmental search is “reasonableness,”’ our cases establish that
warrantless searches are typically unreasonable where ‘a search is
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing.’”231 The Carpenter Court has been criticized for the speed
of this jump. For instance, Alan Rozenshtein commented that the Court
reached this conclusion “[w]ithout much analysis.”232 He would have
preferred a contextual reasonableness analysis for the protection of
Carpenter-style third-party data, with substantial deference to legislative
judgements, rather than a flat warrant rule.233
We see no reason to quarrel with the traditional warrant rule in either
the smart meter or cell site data contexts; Carpenter is on firm doctrinal
229. See supra notes 121–125 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text.
231. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995)).
232. Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE
L.J.F. 943, 946 (2019).
233. See id. at 954–60.
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ground in making the leap from the implication of the Fourth Amendment
to a warrant requirement when the purpose of the data collection is law
enforcement use.234 So this settles the case of the government requesting
energy-consumption data from a private utility for law enforcement
purposes. But this reasonableness question is more complicated when
considering government utilities. Is it a search for a government, such as
a publicly owned utility, to install a smart meter and, if so, is the search
of the energy-usage data reasonable? Or, put another way, what kinds of
protections are required to make such a search reasonable?
Consideration of the Fourth Amendment implications of public utility
smart meter installation goes beyond the criminal law aspects of the
Fourth Amendment. In general, the criminal/noncriminal distinction is
exceptionally important in the context of the Fourth Amendment. When
the government acts as an employer, for instance, it will often have an
understandable need to gather information about current and prospective
employees. Though this information collection would often require a
warrant based upon probable cause in the law enforcement context,
reasonable suspicion is often sufficient in the employment domain.
In contrast . . . public employers are not enforcers of the
criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and
overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is
conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our view,
therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the
type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on
public employers.235
Similarly, the warrant requirement often does not apply in the publiceducation context because, again, school officials are not generally
enforcers of criminal law.236
Based on these precedents, the government may be able to collect
smart meter data for utility purposes even if it would require a warrant to
do so for law enforcement purposes. The reasonableness balancing that
so quickly leads to a warrant requirement in the law enforcement domain
will function differently outside of it. To explore this non-law
enforcement balancing, it is helpful to consider the constitutional right to
information privacy more generally. This right, though based in part in
the Fourth Amendment, stems from the traditions of Griswold v.
Connecticut237 and Roe v. Wade238 rather than the enforcement of
234. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 652–53.
235. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987).
236. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (holding that “school officials need
not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority”).
237. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
238. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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criminal law. One case in the information-privacy domain presents a
close analogy for smart meters. In Whalen v. Roe,239 the Court evaluated
the constitutionality of a New York act requiring reporting and storage of
information concerning all Schedule II drug prescriptions.240 Physicians
were required to report the name of “the prescribing physician; the
dispensing pharmacy; the drug and dosage; and the name, address, and
age of the patient.”241 The district court had struck down the act as an
unnecessary intrusion into one of the “zones of privacy accorded
constitutional protection.”242
The Supreme Court overturned the district court.243 Those challenging
the law had argued that doctors would be less willing to prescribe, and
patients would be less willing to use, certain drugs given these
regulations.244 The Court, however, held that patients’ privacy interests
were not grievously impacted because the law’s data-security provisions
were sufficient to prevent accidental disclosure or inappropriate use of
the information.245 The collection of the information was reasonable
given its value to the public in preventing abuse of prescription drugs and
the safeguards the government imposed to prevent public release of the
data. The limited public-safety purpose, independent of criminal law
enforcement, made constitutionally permissible what was otherwise a
severe intrusion into a sensitive domain.
Since the Supreme Court upheld New York’s information-gathering
statute, it is unclear how intrusive a practice must be to violate the right
to information privacy, or even whether there is such a freestanding right.
Lower courts are split. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
subsequently developed a seven-part test to determine whether the
government could acquire records like those at issue in Whalen.246 This
test, broadly speaking, balances the magnitude of the privacy invasion
(including the harm likely to be inflicted if the data is subsequently
released and the extent of the data-security measures) against the extent
of the state’s interest.247 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth,
239. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
240. See id. at 591, 593.
241. See id. at 593.
242. Id. at 596.
243. Id. at 603–04.
244. Id. at 600.
245. See id. at 600–02.
246. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
247. See id. The factors are: (1) the “type of record requested,” (2) “the information it does
or might contain,” (3) “the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure,” (4)
the injury a disclosure would cause to the relationship that generated the record, (5) the “adequacy
of safeguards to prevent disclosure,” (6) “the degree of need for access,” and (7) whether there is
a public policy reason or statutory mandate militating toward access. Id.; see also Doe v. Se. Pa.
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Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all also recognized the right in some
form,248 but the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has been
more cautious and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has questioned whether there is a constitutional right to
information privacy at all.249
The Supreme Court’s only other major return to the constitutional
right to information privacy sheds further light on how to think of the
“government as utility” question. In NASA v. Nelson,250 the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of the government asking intrusive
questions in its background checks in its capacity as an employer.251 The
expanded background check at issue in Nelson was moderately invasive,
inviting commentary on a potential contractor’s medical status, criminal
history, financial stability, and interpersonal relationships.252 Private
employers often inquire into a broad range of deeply personal topics as
part of their hiring processes, so this was not out of step with industry
practices.253
The Court held that these inquiries were constitutionally
permissible.254 It emphasized that the government has a “much freer
hand” when acting in its capacity as an employer than it does when it
“brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.”255 It could make
the same sorts of inquiries that a private employer would, and these
questions were very common in the private sector.256 The open-ended
Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1135–38 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying this test to the disclosure of an
employee’s HIV status).
248. See, e.g., Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2009); In re
Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559
(2d Cir. 1983); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981).
249. See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089–90 (6th Cir. 1981) (“We do not view the
discussion of confidentiality in Whalen v. Roe as . . . creating a constitutional right to have all
government action weighed against the resulting breach of confidentiality.”); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t
Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir 1997).
250. 562 U.S. 134 (2011).
251. Id. at 138.
252. See id. at 140–42. The applicants themselves were asked standard biographical and
work-history information as well as whether they had used, supplied, or manufactured illegal
drugs in the preceding year. Id. at 141. The applicants’ references, however, were asked an
extensive range of open-ended questions. Id. at 141–42. One question asked whether the reference
had “any reason to question” the employee’s “honesty or trustworthiness” and another whether
the reference knew of any “adverse information” concerning the employee’s “‘violation of the
law,’ ‘financial integrity,’ ‘abuse of alcohol and/or drugs,’ ‘mental or emotional stability,’
‘general behavior or conduct,’ or ‘other matters.’” Id. at 141–42.
253. See Stephen F. Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating
Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 365, 381–400 (1997) (describing the
types of information that employers can and do collect).
254. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 151–52.
255. Id. at 148 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008)).
256. See id. at 155.
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questions, then, were justifiable as a reasonable measure “aimed at
identifying capable employees who [would] faithfully conduct the
Government’s business” and for separating strong and weak
candidates.257
Taking Nelson seriously suggests that the government, as a utility,
should be allowed to collect all the same kinds of information that a
private utility would. The government, wearing its utility hat, has valid
need of that information and it is not unreasonable for the government to
collect information regularly collected by private parties. But taking
Whalen seriously means that the government incurs special obligations
when it uses its “utility hat” to justify the collection of personal
information. It must constantly seek to balance its legitimate need for the
information—both its need as an actor in the national marketplace and its
need as a promoter of the public good—with the privacy concerns of
those whose data it is collecting. And the government must be conscious
of a key difference from Nelson. In that case, people were freely choosing
to enter an employment relationship with the government and therefore
give to the government all the information that they would normally give
to an employer. People are often not freely choosing to have smart meters
installed.
Only one federal court of appeals—the Seventh Circuit—has wrestled
with the issue of smart meters in the post-Carpenter world, and its
treatment of reasonableness and government hat wearing is instructive.
In Naperville Smart Meter v. City of Naperville,258 a nonprofit
organization opposed the city’s replacement of the old analog meters with
new smart meters, alleging that the city’s collection of the smart meter
data constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.259
Since the smart meter initiative was being implemented by a municipal
utility, the mere installation of the meters raised Fourth Amendment
concerns; the government would receive the energy-consumption reports
directly rather than from a third-party utility.260 Naperville’s smart meters
collect residents’ energy-consumption data every fifteen minutes, the
information is stored for up to three years, and residents are unable to opt
out of the smart meter program; participation is mandatory.261
Considering the voluntariness and exposure prongs of Carpenter, the
court readily concluded that smart meter data—specifically smart meter

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See id. at 154.
900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 524.
Id. at 527.
See id. at 524.
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installation—implicated the Fourth Amendment.262 As the Seventh
Circuit recognized, “[I]n this context, a choice to share data imposed by
fiat is no choice at all. . . . [A] home occupant does not assume the risk of
near constant monitoring by choosing to have electricity in her home.”263
The disclosure of information was therefore neither voluntary nor the
result of any affirmative act by the person being surveilled. The Seventh
Circuit further noted that smart meters have been adopted “only by a
portion of a highly specialized industry,” which under Kyllo, would make
them not in “general public use.”264 This seems somewhat absurd—the
highly specialized industry in question being one that is almost
universally used. But the court may have been using this analysis to
buttress its shift from Carpenter’s focus on third-party business records
to Kyllo’s focus on collection using new technology.
Having easily and, in our view, correctly concluded that the collection
of smart meter data by a public utility is a search, the court then assessed
whether the search was reasonable.265 To start, the Seventh Circuit
properly considered the benefits that smart meters bring to the city of
Naperville.266 The court noted that “[s]mart meters allow utilities to
reduce costs, provide cheaper power to consumers, encourage energy
efficiency, and increase grid stability. . . . [T]hese interests render the
city’s search reasonable, where the search is unrelated to law
enforcement . . . and presents little risk of corollary criminal
consequences.”267 The court’s analysis included consideration of who
was collecting the data and for what purpose, and it balanced the interests
of those involved.268 The court noted that “Naperville’s amended ‘Smart
Grid Customer Bill of Rights’ clarifies that the city’s public utility will
not provide customer data to third parties, including law enforcement,
without a warrant or court order.”269 It was persuaded by the benefits
provided by smart meters and the additional protections afforded the
customer data.270 Notably, the court warned that its holding was limited
262. Id. at 525, 527 (“Their data, even when collected at fifteen-minute intervals, reveals
details about the home that would be otherwise unavailable to government officials with a
physical search. Naperville therefore ‘searches’ its residents’ homes when it collects this data.”).
263. Id. at 527.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 528–29.
266. Id. at 529.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 528–29.
269. Id. at 528.
270. Id. at 528–29 (“Since these searches are not performed as part of a criminal
investigation we can turn immediately to an assessment of whether they are reasonable, ‘by
balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate government interests.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court,
542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004))).
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to the particular circumstances of Naperville and that if the data was
collected in shorter intervals (more frequently than once every fifteen
minutes) or if it was “more easily accessible to law enforcement or other
city officials,” then its conclusion would likely change.271 The Seventh
Circuit oddly did not engage with Whalen or Nelson, two cases that would
have naturally supported its conclusions.
Part I’s ode to smart meters should have persuaded you that, on
balance, the town of Naperville is better off for having them installed.
But Naperville highlights a fundamental tension in smart meter privacy.
There are huge public benefits to having smart meters as a tool for grid
management. Utilities need this information for a host of extremely
important purposes, and most of the initiatives that utilities want to use
the data for will only help consumers. Few would object to their utility
being promptly informed that their house is now without power due to a
storm, for instance. But there are many other potential uses for this data.
What about energy-efficiency studies? Public-awareness campaigns?
Identifiable data provided to researchers, or even private for-profit
vendors of smart energy solutions? Even if you agree that a warrant
should be required for law enforcement access to smart meter data, that
still leaves unresolved any number of privacy questions.
This Part showed that obtaining smart meter data from a private utility
for law enforcement purposes implicates the Fourth Amendment and
should require a warrant. It also showed that a public utility installing a
smart meter for non-law enforcement purposes, and therefore collecting
the data directly, also implicates the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment analysis required by Nelson and Whalen makes clear that
non-law enforcement government information gathering will be
subjected to a nuanced reasonableness analysis. This requires the kind of
detail work that is hard to manage working solely from constitutional first
principles. And there is a real danger here of ending up with low
constitutional protection against government information collection if
there is no statutory protection against private information collection,
which can be seen in how the Court’s analysis in Nelson turned on the
practices of private employers. This is an area that could therefore benefit
greatly from legislative action to set minimum privacy standards for both
271. Id. at 529. The Seventh Circuit’s concern with duration and the party collecting the data
are similar to concerns raised by both Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Samuel Alito. See
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The net result is
that GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of
intimate information about any person whom the government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses
to track—may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society.’” (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Flaum, J., concurring), vacated, 565 U.S. 1189 (2012))); id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring)
(“Devices like the one used in the present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively
easy and cheap.”).
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governmental and private information collection. Part III therefore moves
away from the constitutional analysis and considers legislative solutions
to energy privacy. It examines both the solutions already enacted in
several states as well as some proposed federal legislation. Ultimately,
we set out a model for how energy privacy should be regulated.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO PROTECTING ENERGY DATA
The data collected by smart meters, including information from
interconnected devices, provides utilities with insight into when and how
energy is being used in short increments of time. As discussed in Part I,
that information can be used to increase the efficiency and effectiveness
of the current grid and transform it into a smart grid. Better managing
how and when energy is produced and used will be key to reducing both
carbon emissions and costs.272 Thus, the information supplied by smart
meters can and should be used by utilities to achieve these goals.
Since this information should be collectable, the question then
becomes what rules and regulations must be applied to that collection.
Here, state and federal legislative action may prove superior to relying on
courts. The legislative process is much better suited for the kind of
detailed factfinding required to create a unified regulatory scheme. And
federal regulation may be particularly helpful in that it would avoid
problems of uneven and haphazard local action.273 Courts, by contrast,
are bound by the facts of the cases presented to them and are often unable
or unwilling to provide guidance beyond those facts. Carpenter, for
instance, raised questions about dozens of issues and it may be years
before courts give clear answers to any of them.274
Further, Fourth Amendment litigation concerns only government
action—it does not apply to private companies.275 One can therefore
regulate all law enforcement use of smart meter data via the Fourth
Amendment but not all commercial use of it. This could lead to awkward
results, with those who happened to live in municipalities with public
utilities enjoying privacy protection while those in municipalities with
private utilities being left entirely at the mercy of data brokers. As
mentioned in Part II, it could also ultimately undermine constitutional
privacy protection if energy-usage data is not also protected in the private
sphere; courts might be reluctant to impose a warrant requirement for data
that can be freely obtained on the open market. A legislative body,
272. Horne et al., supra note 51, at 65.
273. See Forbush, supra note 109, at 375 (“The very real possibility of ratepayer energy
consumption data being unevenly regulated by state legislatures and public service commissions
demonstrates the need for a baseline privacy standard set at the national level.”).
274. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
275. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974).
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however, can always impose additional safeguards beyond those required
by the Constitution and can regulate both private and public entities.
The United States currently does not have a single comprehensive
federal law regulating the collection and use of personal data.276 Instead
it has a “patchwork system of federal and state laws . . . that can
sometimes overlap, dovetail and contradict one another.”277 At the federal
level, for example, banking privacy is regulated by the Gramm-LeachBliley Act,278 educational privacy by the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act,279 and health privacy by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.280 Sometimes these focused privacy regulations are
powerful. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act,281 for
example, has enabled a wave of lawsuits.282 Yet other times they are
comparatively toothless. All three of those federal statutes lack a private
right of action.283
Due to the depth and breadth of data now collected by electric, gas,
and water smart meters, it is time that this domain too receive its own
targeted federal regulatory scheme. The question is how best to structure
that regime. As will be seen below, we borrow aspects from many other
privacy laws. Overall, the regime seeks to empower the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to regulate the collection of smart meter data, giving
it the kind of enforcement authority that it enjoys under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act284 and requiring it to issue the kinds of guidelines that it
276. Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection [https://
perma.cc/DJY3-JGSA].
277. Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview, WESTLAW (2018), https://
1.next.westlaw.com/6-502-0467?transitionType=Default&contextData=%28sc.Default %29.
278. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6803
(2018)).
279. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571 (1974) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g).
280. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
281. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008).
282. Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to Identity Theft: Public Perceptions of
Biometric Privacy Harms, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 107, 108–09, 113 (2019).
283. George C. Hlavac & Edward J. Easterly, FERPA Primer: The Basics and Beyond,
NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLEGES & EMPLOYERS (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.naceweb.org/public-policy
-and-legal/legal-issues/ferpa-primer-the-basics-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/F7PW-X6HY]
(“Courts have routinely held that FERPA does not create a private right of action against the
educational institution.”); Can a Patient Sue for a HIPAA Violation?, HIPAA J. (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.hipaajournal.com/sue-for-hipaa-violation/ [https://perma.cc/XP88-MNSW]; The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/glba/
[https://perma.cc/8AX7-6JFM] (“Enforcement rests solely with federal government agencies,
leaving the individual no private right of action.”).
284. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681–1681x).
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did under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998.285 Due
to the FTC’s current charge to protect consumer data, expanding its
responsibility and enforcement power into the area of smart meter data
would be the most effective solution at this time.
This Part outlines the major features of that proposed legislation—the
Energy Use Privacy Act (EUPA). This Act would explicitly empower the
FTC to regulate the use of smart meter data within set guidelines,
including addressing when government actors should be able to access
smart meter data and when and how it should be shared with private
companies. In creating this new regulatory regime, this Article draws
inspiration from current statutes in other sectors and proposed statutes
that have not yet passed.286 Further, several states have already started
legislating in this area and provide excellent models for the kind of data
regime that is vital to protecting consumer privacy.287 Ultimately, a
uniform and consistent regulatory framework for smart meter data and
the devices that connect to the meters could enable the United States to
achieve smart grid development while also protecting private consumer
information.
Before detailing this proposed legislation, it is worth reviewing both
a previous federal proposal for energy privacy as well as the FTC’s more
general role in the privacy space. Though there is no current
comprehensive federal legislation protecting energy privacy, the
proposed federal Electric Consumer Right to Know Act,288 sponsored by
then-Senators Mark Udall (D-Colo.) and Scott Brown (R-Mass.), would
have provided some protection. It stated that “consumers should have the
right to control the electric energy usage information of the consumers
and the right to privacy for the information when third party aggregators
of data are involved in creation, management, or collection of the
information.”289 The proposed Act also stated that “consumers should

285. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-728 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6501).
Congress has repeatedly outsourced such regulations to the FTC. See, e.g., id.
286. For example, “the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) obligates financial institutions to
respect the privacy of customers and protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’
‘nonpublic personal information’ by monitoring their sharing of customer information with third
parties.” Forbush, supra note 109, at 354 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809). The Fair Credit
Reporting Act requires institutions to prevent the disclosure of private information and issues
fines if its requirements are violated. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: AN FTC STAFF REPORT WITH SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS 60,
89–90 (2011).
287. Cassarah Brown, States Get Smart: Encouraging and Regulating Smart Grid
Technologies, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/
regulating-and-encouraging-smart-grid-technologies.aspx [https://perma.cc/3A5K-6LYP].
288. S. 1029, 112th Cong. (2011).
289. Id. § 2(7).
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retain the right to the privacy and security of electric energy usage
information of the consumers created through usage.”290
The limitation of this proposed Act is that it was more focused on
providing consumers with the right to understand and access their
electric-usage information and less on protecting that information from
other parties. Though empowering consumers through disclosure is a
helpful starting point—and certainly preferable to not providing
information to consumers—far more protection is necessary. As an
increasingly large body of literature shows, there is great reason to be
skeptical of any approach to privacy that relies heavily on people actively
seeking out information and making informed choices.291 Most people do
not want to read long privacy policies or actively manage their privacy in
the consumer sphere. Also, disclosure will only accomplish so much,
especially when, as here, people have limited ability to change utility
service providers.
The desire to move beyond disclosure leads to a focus on set rules. As
an initial step in establishing these rules, it is essential to identify a single
agency to oversee the responsible sharing of smart meter data. Smart
meters are likely to interface with a variety of optional consumer smart
home products. Were these interfacing products regulated by the FTC
(which has evolved into the de facto federal protector of consumer
privacy292) while the meters themselves were regulated by, say, the
Department of Energy, policy could easily grow incoherent. Therefore,
localizing the responsibility to govern information sharing in a single
entity is preferred. This distinguishes between the immediate use of smart
meter data for smart grid management, which should be operated by local
utilities, and the use of the data for other purposes, which should be
subject to FTC oversight.
Currently, the FTC is the agency most directly involved in the privacy
regulation of smart home devices. Under Section 5 of the FTC Act,293 the
290. Id. § 2(6).
291. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More Than You Wanted to Know About the
Failures of Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63, 71–72 (2015); Florencia MarottaWurgler, Self-Regulation and Competition in Privacy Policies, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S13, S16 (2016)
(showing that privacy policies claiming compliance with privacy certifications are often not
actually in compliance); Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the
Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S 485, 487 (2015); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy
Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1885 (2013); Jedidiah
Bracy, Are Notice and Consent Possible with the Internet of Things?, IAPP (Nov. 20, 2013),
https://iapp.org/news/a/is-notice-and-consent-possible-with-the-internet-of-things/ [https://perma
.cc/Q2LD-C6XC]. For a limited defense of notice and choice, see M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice
Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1047–50 (2012).
292. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600–06 (2014).
293. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018)).
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FTC is charged with preventing companies from engaging in “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”294 This has been
the main source of its regulatory authority for enforcing privacy policies
and preventing egregious misuses of consumer data.295 This enforcement,
however, largely takes the form of requiring companies to not lie in their
privacy policies,296 and companies may be able to avoid FTC
enforcement merely by not making promises about how they will manage
private data.297 Moreover, the FTC’s emphasis on regulating companies
through their privacy policies is limited in light of “[s]ocial science
research reveal[ing] that consumers do not read or understand privacy
policies, are heavily influenced by the way choices are framed, and
harbor many preexisting assumptions that are incorrect.”298 In this way,
the FTC’s policies in the smart home-device arena reflect the same
problems with notice and choice that were just reviewed.299
The FTC’s approach to privacy regulation has been criticized on other
grounds as well. It has been called overly cautious for failing to
meaningfully punish large companies such as Google and Apple when
they overstep.300 Prior to June 2019, the FTC’s largest privacy fine was
in 2012 for $22.5 million.301 The subject of the fine, Google, earned $46
billion in revenue that year.302 And, notably, the FTC could only issue
that fine because Google violated a preexisting consent decree—the FTC
does not have direct fining authority under Section 5 and must wait for a
bad actor to recidivate in violation of an existing judgment to issue a
294. Id.
295. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 292, at 600–06.
296. See id. at 628–31.
297. See Privacy and Security Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/privacy-security-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/B7X6-WJUW] (laying out FTC enforcement policies). See also Public
Statement, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright Regarding the Matter of
Nomi Technologies, Inc. (Apr. 23, 2015) (expressing concern that the overzealous enforcement
of privacy policies might deter transparency).
298. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 292, at 667.
299. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 21–22 (2015).
300. Nicholas Confessore & Cecilia Kang, Facebook Data Scandals Stoke Criticism That a
Privacy Watchdog Too Rarely Bites, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/12/30/technology/facebook-data-privacy-ftc.html [https://perma.cc/58HX-VET7] (“In
more than 40 interviews, former and current F.T.C. officials, lawmakers, Capitol Hill staff
members, and consumer advocates said that as evidence of abuses has piled up against tech
companies, the F.T.C. has been too cautious.”).
301. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC
Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser (Aug.
9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-millionsettle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented [https://perma.cc/7YPZ-8WHE].
302. Alphabet Revenue 2006–2019, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/
charts/GOOG/alphabet/revenue [https://perma.cc/Z8G4-LCJX].
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monetary penalty.303 Moreover, the FTC has not filed that many privacy
complaints. In fact, it only brought 170 between 1997 and 2014.304 The
recent $5 billion fine against Facebook, which covers years of privacy
violations, is exceptional.305 And even the effectiveness of that fine is
disputed, as two of the five FTC Commissioners filed dissenting
statements calling it inadequate.306
In one representative smart home device case, the FTC filed a
complaint against TRENDnet for security flaws in its home security
cameras.307 These cameras were supposed to have both public and private
modes.308 The public mode was supposed to be visible to anyone with an
appropriate link.309 The private mode was supposed to be visible only to
people with the correct login credentials.310 Due to a software flaw, even
private feeds were publicly viewable and camera IP information even
revealed the approximate locations of the video feeds.311 The FTC alleged
that TRENDnet’s claims of security constituted false or misleading
representations because it “failed to provide reasonable security to
prevent unauthorized access to the live feeds from its IP cameras.”312 In
short, TRENDnet had promised private feeds and not delivered them. The
FTC required TRENDnet to establish a comprehensive security program
and provide additional technical and physical safeguards to prevent such
a thing from happening again.313 Notably, it did not fine TRENDnet.314 It
settled a similar case against D-Link on similar terms in July 2019.315
As shown in TRENDnet, this enforcement is very focused on two
kinds of privacy problems. First is the broken promise. A camera or
303. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 292, at 605.
304. Id. at 600.
305. Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Approves Facebook Fine of About $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES
(July 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/technology/facebook-ftc-fine.html
[https:// perma.cc/WKV9-KQLC].
306. Public Statement, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding the
Matter of Facebook, Inc. (July 24, 2019); Public Statement, Dissenting Statement of
Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter Regarding the Matter of FTC vs. Facebook (July 24,
2019).
307. Complaint at 4, In re TRENDnet, Inc., No. C-4426 (Jan. 16, 2014).
308. Id. at 2.
309. See id. at 5.
310. See id.
311. Id. (“[The] compromised live feeds . . . allowed the unauthorized surveillance of infants
sleeping in their cribs, young children playing, and adults engaging in typical daily activities.”).
312. Id. at 6.
313. Agreement Containing Consent Order at 4, In re TRENDnet, Inc., No. C-4426 (Jan. 16,
2014).
314. See id.
315. See Lesley Fair, D-Link Settlement: Internet of Things Depends on Secure Software
Development, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (July 2, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/
business-blog/2019/07/d-link-settlement-internet-things-depends-secure-software [https://perma
.cc/2ZAY-93CA].
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network is described as private, but the company fails to deliver on that
privacy guarantee. Second is the unauthorized hacker. Information is
supposed to be restricted to those with security credentials, but it can be
more widely accessed. An FTC staff report on the Internet of Things
echoes this emphasis, listing security as its first issue.316 There is a sense
in which this is the bare minimum that the government can ask of a
company—do not affirmatively lie and do not leak private information
by accident. The much harder question is whether the government should
go further. When should intentional (as opposed to accidental, hacked, or
leaked) sharing of consumer information be limited? That same FTC staff
report notably waffled on this issue. The report was summarizing the
conclusions of a workshop discussion on privacy in the Internet of Things
and the participants appear to have been extremely divided.317 Some
participants were concerned about companies discovering unexpected
uses for consumer data, while other participants thought minimizing data
collection to prevent such future uses would “chok[e] off potential
benefits and innovation.”318
Consider a third-party energy-monitoring product called Sense. This
product works independently of a smart meter; the user must install
physical clamps around the main power leads.319 The device then
measures electrical usage several times a second, using the resultant data
as inputs for the same kind of device disaggregation described earlier.320
It is a classic Internet of Things device that just happens to duplicate the
functionality of a particularly intelligent smart meter. By default, it is
going to be regulated under the same FTC consumer-privacy framework
as the cameras in TRENDnet. Given that it is going to be within the FTC’s
purview and will force the FTC to confront all the same data-sharing
trade-offs as smart meters, it makes sense to also task the FTC with
regulating smart meters themselves.
But even if the FTC chooses not to apply a heightened privacy
standard to Internet of Things devices, the lack of choice involved in the
utility sphere—people often cannot choose their utility or whether to have
a smart meter—shifts the balance in favor of more restrictions. People
must actively choose to install Sense whereas they likely will not be able
to choose whether to have a smart meter installed. Even if the Internet of
Things in general should remain something of a wild west, here there
should be greater regulation. We therefore propose legislating additional
316. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 299, at 10.
317. Id. at 3–4.
318. See id. at 21 (alteration in original) (quoting Dan Caprio, McKenna, Long & Aldridge,
LLP).
319. How It Works, supra note 58.
320. See id.; see also supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (explaining device
disaggregation).
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authority for the FTC, allowing it to serve a more proactive role than its
baseline Section 5 authority permits. Specifically, the FTC should be
required to issue regulations for the protection of consumer data—rather
than the advice and recommendations that it puts out in the data-security
context—and to enforce those regulations with monetary fines. In this
way, EUPA should mirror the enforcement authority given to the FTC
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.321
This role of the FTC is the most important part of the proposal. The
basic idea of protecting consumer privacy in this domain, at some level,
has been around for a while. Some of the principles we promote were
reflected in the Voluntary Code of Conduct proposed by the Department
of Energy in 2015, for instance.322 But the very first word in the title of
that document reveals its most fundamental problem: “voluntary.”
Energy-consumption data pierces the walls of the home, invading what
are otherwise the most protected spaces in daily lives. Industry selfregulation and voluntary compliance are insufficient here.
A. Use of Smart Meter Data by the Utilities
Many of the benefits of smart meters for grid management involve the
use of smart meter data by the utilities themselves. It is the utility, after
all, that needs to know about localized power outages, to calibrate
production to meet demand, and to selectively deactivate portions of the
grid in emergencies. To realize these benefits, smart meter information
does not need to be shared beyond the utility and its chosen (and carefully
monitored) subcontractors. There should, therefore, be a sharp distinction
between use of this information by the utility for internal purposes, which
should be presumptively allowed without restriction, and use by any other
actor. Since the utility is the entity that naturally collects smart meter data
and has the most use for it, it makes the most sense for the utility, whether
it be publicly or privately owned, to be the primary custodian of smart
meter data. Keeping this data housed within utilities may also reassure
consumers, who are more likely to trust their utilities than third parties.323
The privacy protections of smart meter data available to consumers
should not depend on the type of utility serving their area. For the most
321. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681–1681x (2012)).
322. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT (VCC): FINAL CONCEPTS AND
PRINCIPLES 1 (2015), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/01/f19/VCC%20Concepts%
20and%20Principles%202015_01_08%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M54-UVC7].
323. Chien-fei Chen et al., Between the Technology Acceptance Model and Sustainable
Energy Technology Acceptance Model: Investigating Smart Meter Acceptance in the United
States, 25 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 93, 101 (2017) (noting that the participants of the Amazon
Mechanical Turk survey “generally trusted their utilities, but were fairly concerned with
unauthorized third parties’ misuse of [smart meter] data or personal information”).
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part, consumers are unable to switch between utility providers; thus,
leaving consumers exposed to varying levels of data protection based on
the public, private, or ambiguously mixed character of the utility is
problematic. Instead, a uniform set of protections should be established
for all consumers.
In the context of a publicly owned utility, questions may be raised as
to what governmental entity owns the smart meter data. In that case,
ownership should be limited to the utility itself and not a larger governing
body, such as the city or township.324 The goal of this new regulatory
scheme is to limit the access to the smart meter data while providing
utilities with the ability to manage the smart grid. Allowing the smart
meter data to be housed by a governmental entity other than the public
utility risks exposure of this private data to a wider group of people,
potentially including law enforcement.
As the constitutional information-privacy cases like Nelson and
Whalen illustrate,325 courts should distinguish between different
government uses of information when weighing privacy rights. Utilities
are properly positioned to use this data both for the benefit of grid
management and to protect consumers. The proposed regulatory scheme
would not only establish that utilities are owners of the smart meter data,
but it would also establish guidelines and regulations around when
commercial entities and law enforcement agencies can access and utilize
the data. Since these entities are seeking to access the data for different
purposes—market development for one326 and in aid of investigations for
the other327—different guidelines must apply to them.
324. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 71–72 (noting that public power systems can include
local, municipal, state, and regional utilities, which can range in size from tiny municipal
distribution companies to giant systems such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power;
some are regulated by state public utility commissions and others are regulated by local
governments or are self-regulated); What is Public Power?, PUB. POWER FOR YOUR COMMUNITY,
https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/municipalization-what_is_public_power.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PU4Z-P6VT] (“Most public power utilities are owned by cities and towns, but
many are owned by counties, public utility districts, and even states.”).
325. See supra Section II.D.
326. Forbush, supra note 109, at 367 (“[P]otential commercial uses for smart meter data
include use by ‘[r]etailers of appliances, extended warranties, or repair services [who] may want
[smart meter] data . . . to provide advertising . . . before an appliance fails,’ and ‘[i]nsurers [who]
may want to look for evidence of unauthorized conduct . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting
Mark F. Foley, The Dangers of Meter Data (Part I), SMARTGRIDNEWS.COM (June 2, 2008),
http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/Technologies_Metering_News/The_Dangers_of
_Meter_Data_Part_1-446.html)).
327. United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A
DEA agent filed an affidavit in the district court stating that the subpoenaed [electricityconsumption] records were relevant to determine whether individuals at three residences were
involved in the manufacture and distribution of controlled substances.”); McLean, supra note 64,
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B. Law Enforcement Access
Though law enforcement agencies have a strong and legitimate
interest in detecting illegal activities occurring in a home and verifying a
suspect’s claims about what occurred in a home, the new regulatory
regime must incorporate the baseline understanding that consumers have
an expectation of privacy in the smart meter data generated from their
homes. As discussed in Part II, consumers are not necessarily consenting
to the installation of smart meters or freely sharing this data with the
utilities—these are required aspects of modern-day life. Moreover, law
enforcement must not be able to utilize the business-records exception to
access smart meter data records collected by a private utility.328
This is a substantial change from current practice. There has been a
long “history of voluntary utility compliance with government requests
to share personal consumer usage information.”329 Though a few states
have statutes protecting consumer utility data, even these privacyprotective states often allow utilities to respond to requests by law
enforcement if they have subpoena or other court order rather than
insisting on a warrant.330 In light of cases like Kyllo and Carpenter,
however, the warrantless provision of smart meter data to law
enforcement agencies is overly intrusive. The records of the utilities are
simply too revealing and go back too far to allow for sharing without legal
process. Law enforcement agencies should have to demonstrate probable
cause and argue for the need to access such data before an independent
arbiter (that is, “get a warrant”) instead of meeting the lower standard
required for court orders or subpoenas.
Though a warrant requirement will undoubtedly slow criminal
investigations, it will not unduly frustrate the investigative process.
at 885 (“Smart meter data present a potential new tool for law enforcement to investigate a broad
set of crimes and even track people’s whereabouts. Law enforcement could use smart meter data
as either direct or circumstantial evidence for any number of crimes.”); Affidavit of Probable
Cause to Obtain An Arrest Warrant, supra note 3 (demonstrating that another example of this
occurred in a recent case where a police department in Arkansas was provided the data from a
smart water meter by the local utility without a warrant to aid it in the investigation of a murder)
(“As previously mentioned, at least 140 gallons of water was used at James’ residence in the two
hour period between 0100-0300 hours. Upon reviewing all water usage information, since
October 2013 at James’ residence, this excessive amount of water usage between 0100 and 0300
hours had never before occurred.”).
328. Contra Golden Valley, 689 F.3d at 1116–17 (holding that consumers lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in energy-consumption records because they had “no
possessory or ownership interest” in the records held by a utility company (quoting United States
v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000)).
329. McLean, supra note 64, at 886.
330. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 710.6 (2019) (“Pursuant to a warrant, subpoena duces
tecum, or other court order.”); COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3027(b) (2019) (“[T]his includes
responses to requests of the Commission, warrants, subpoenas, [or] courts orders . . . .”).
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Recall that smart meter data is in the custody of the utility. Consumerscum-criminal suspects do not have the ability to edit or delete their data.
Smart meter data is also neither a weapon that suspects can seize nor a
bomb that must be quickly located and disarmed. In short, this data can
wait.
We can imagine a set of law enforcement uses that might be ill-suited
for the warrant process. Smart meter data could be useful, for instance, in
determining if a house is presently occupied in advance of a raid or an
arrest, or as part of a manhunt. But we are aware of no cases in which it
has been used in that fashion. So, though we are open to persuasion that
there are cases in which a narrow exigency exception must be added to
the statute, we do not believe we need to craft one quite yet. If one is
necessary, the Wiretap Act provides a suitable model for ex post approval
under special circumstances and Congress could easily borrow the
language from that statute for this one.331
More controversially, EUPA should go further than imposing a
warrant requirement by borrowing portions of the superwarrant
requirements from the Wiretap Act.332 These additional requirements are
burdensome and are part of the Wiretap Act because of the uniquely
sensitive information contained in real-time communications. But they
are justified in this context as well. The home is a special place; allowing
the government to see through its very walls is precisely the kind of
technological development that has so upset the Court in cases like Kyllo.
A judge should therefore need to find probable cause that particular
information concerning the offense will be obtained from the smart meter
data requested. Further, the court must find that alternatives to accessing
the smart meter data were attempted and failed, or “reasonably appear to
be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”333 To prevent this
from becoming a routine request, only government officials of a certain
level should be able to apply for a warrant to access the data.334 Finally,
to protect against unnecessary governmental access, the updated
provision should minimize the amount of information that can be
produced in response to the warrant—limited to very specific time
periods to avoid sweeping in data beyond the scope of the initial order.335
In crafting these additional restrictions, we seek to restrict two
possible types of bulk data collection. First, the police should not be able
to request smart meter data for an entire residential district to determine
331. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (2018).
332. See Paul Ohm, The Investigative Dynamics of the Use of Malware by Law Enforcement,
26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 329–31 (2017) (discussing de facto superwarrant protections,
particularly in relation to the Wiretap Act).
333. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (imposing a similar requirement for wiretaps).
334. See, e.g., id. § 2516(1) (imposing a similar requirement for wiretaps).
335. See, e.g., id. § 2518(5) (imposing a similar requirement for wiretaps).
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who was home at a given time. Second, the police should not be able to
engage in, or require utilities to engage in, data mining based on an
energy-use suspect profile.336 In each case, there is an easy argument that
the information is relevant to potential investigations and thus might
satisfy a subpoena requirement. The additional restrictions would make
it much harder to justify these sorts of requests.
C. Private Access
Government actors are not the only parties that are interested in
accessing smart meter data. Many private companies, including those
working to develop energy-efficiency or renewable-energy programs for
utility customers, would like access to develop their products, enhance
their algorithms, and target their potential clients.337 Private companies
will also be involved in the development of the smart grid, especially in
creating appliances and software applications for smart home energymanagement systems. To encourage innovation and new developments
in this area, these companies need to be allowed to create products that
will interact with smart meters—it is only through automation and
interconnectivity that the true potential of the smart grid will be realized.
But the risk associated with smart grid development is that the
extremely private information will be gathered from the home—the place
where privacy is the most important. Marketers, among other private
companies, will want to tap into this data to find out helpful information
about the household to target certain products to it.338 Targeted
advertising of an individual or a household represents an area of huge
interest. For example, prior work in this area suggested that “they could
use energy consumption data to identify heavy energy users, crossreference that data with households that have not applied for a new
furnace permit in twenty years, and target those residents for furnace
replacement programs.”339Additionally, insurance companies are
interested in accessing home smart meter data for underwriting
purposes.340 These companies are outside of the consumer–utility
relationship and therefore require additional restrictions on what they can
access.
336. Generally, this applies to marijuana-growing operations.
337. Andrew Bartholomew, Note, The Smart Grid in Massachusetts: A Proposal for a
Consumer Data Privacy Policy, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 92 (2016) (“If these third parties
were permitted to acquire consumer usage information directly from the utilities, it might create
an avenue through which commercial efficiency operations could identify potential customers and
market their services accordingly.”).
338. Forbush, supra note 109, at 367 (noting that the potential commercial uses for smart
meter data include appliance retailers, repair-service companies, and insurance-coverage
companies).
339. Klass & Wilson, supra note 12, at 1100.
340. Forbush, supra note 109, at 367.
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One study has indicated,
[t]rust concerns might also arise from perceived loss of
control, especially the control over [smart meter] data, so
utilities enterprise managers should allow customers to
retain some level of control and . . . combat misperceptions
that [smart meter]s are designed to control residents’ energy
consumption at any time and monitor them like “big
brother.”341
To have more control over their smart meter data, consumers need to be
made aware of exactly the kind of data that a company is able to collect
from their homes and how the data is being used and provided some
mechanism for control of that data. Moreover, consumers should be able
to decide whether to share their data with private companies and, after
sharing it, limit what their data may be used for. An important goal of any
legislation in this area should be to prevent the creation and sale of
electronic dossiers of consumers’ home lives as catalogued by their smart
meters and connected smart devices. And, due to consumers’ limited time
and attention, an effective regulatory regime cannot rely solely on
boilerplate grants of customer consent. Protecting privacy will require
more than a one-time check box.
For commercial entities, EUPA should include provisions that provide
consumers with more information and power to protect their private data.
As a model for this kind of regulation, consider the example of the
California Consumer Privacy Act.342 In 2018, California passed the most
progressive privacy law in the United States, which provides consumers
with several new rights related to their personal data.343 The Act includes
the right to know what personal information a business has collected and
the right to opt out of allowing a business to sell personal information to
third parties, and it requires third-party data disclosures to consumers.344
Other states also have statutory privacy protections that do not allow
utilities to share monthly consumer data without the customer’s written
or electronic consent.345 Ohio goes further by requiring that utilities also
include a statement highlighting customers’ right of refusal to have their
data released.346 Texas prohibits an electric utility from “selling, sharing,
or disclosing information generated, provided, or otherwise collected

341. Chien-fei Chen at al., supra note 323, at 101.
342. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2019).
343. Jolly, supra note 277, at 5.
344. CIV. § 1798.100.
345. See Data Access, AM. COUNCIL FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., https://database.aceee.
org/state/data-access [https://perma.cc/5TST-JLL3].
346. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4901:1-10-05(J) (2019).
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from an advanced metering system.”347 But the Texas public utility
commission allows an electric utility to share information with an
affiliated corporation or other third-party entity “if the information is to
be used only for the purpose of providing electric utility service to the
customer or other customer-approved services.”348 Similarly in Colorado,
utilities are only authorized to utilize customer smart meter data
“exclusively in furtherance of predefined smart grid goals.”349 Congress
can look to these provisions when deciding which consumer protections
it wants to include in EUPA. At a minimum, consumers should be
notified when utilities seek to share their smart meter data and should
receive information about whether they are able to decline to participate.
One possibility that does not appear to have been explored is the use
of the utility as a communication portal between third parties and utility
customers. Imagine that an energy-efficiency company believes that its
product can save money for customers with a given energy profile. One
approach would be to allow the utility to sell a list of such customers to
the company without consumer consent. This is problematic from a
privacy perspective for obvious reasons. Another approach is to allow
consumers to opt into third-party marketing. This is better from a privacy
perspective but runs into serious scope-of-consent issues—it would be a
challenge to appropriately calibrate how much information should go
from utility to company or to sensibly decide how many companies
should get the data, and one could easily imagine most consumers finding
the choice confusing. A third possibility would be to have the utility serve
as a matchmaker. It could host an energy-efficiency portal (as many
utilities do) and populate it with offers from energy companies that the
utility’s own data suggest are good matches for the consumer. The
consumer could then decide whether to reach out to the companies. This
would, in a way, be nothing more than an expansion of energy-efficiency
programs, such as the Home Energy Assessment program, offered by
many utilities.350 This would also provide consumers with a single point
of contact if they wish to assert, or waive, privacy protections.
The above describes the challenge of marketing—how to connect
consumer to company to allow for socially beneficial transactions—but
does not as directly address product development. How can companies
safely be given enough information to enable them to create new energyefficient solutions? Here it may be beneficial to borrow from another
federal privacy statute, the Health Insurance Portability and

347. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.107(k) (West 2019).
348. Id. (emphasis added).
349. McLean, supra note 64, at 898.
350. See, e.g., Home Energy Assessment, COMED, https://www.comed.com/WaysToSave/
ForYourHome/Pages/SingleFamily.aspx [https://perma.cc/MUN7-ECTM].
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Accountability Act (HIPAA).351 Both medical and energy research
benefit greatly from the sharing of individual information, yet there are
also great privacy risks in both contexts. The HIPAA solution to this
dilemma is to have two possible channels for research use of medical
information.352 The first is to allow free use of de-identified
information.353 In the energy domain this could cover many uses. Though
location-based characteristics are relevant to energy analysis, the biggest
of those is weather, and weather is notoriously large. One does not need
block-level granularity to track the effect of temperature increases on airconditioning costs. The FTC could do exactly what the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services did in the HIPAA context: develop
guidelines for what constitutes sufficiently de-identified data in this
domain and allow utilities to distribute exactly that much information.354
The FTC should also have companies obtaining this de-identified data
agree to certain use restrictions, particularly a restriction on efforts to reidentify consumers or to link the smart meter data to individually
identifiable datasets.
HIPAA also allows for the use of individually identifiable health
information in research under tight restrictions.355 In general, this
information can only be obtained for specific planned research studies
(rather than general “may be useful later” studies) that have been
reviewed by an ethics board.356 Furthermore, the information must be
carefully protected, and the affected patient must give consent. 357 These
requirements seem ill-suited for the kind of big-data approaches that
energy-efficiency companies wish to employ. The de-identified path is
therefore likely to be better suited for most energy projects. As described
in the next Section, many local utilities are already implementing this
kind of information sharing using their own standards for anonymization.

351. Though we disagree with Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson on many points, we
think they are correct to use HIPAA as a model for making energy consumption data available for
research purposes.
352. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(c)-(d) (2019).
353. See id. § 164.502(d).
354. See id. § 164.514(a)–(c) (outlining the guidelines for what constitutes sufficiently deidentified data).
355. See id. § 164.502(c). See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTING
PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION IN RESEARCH: UNDERSTANDING THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE
(2004), https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/HIPAA_Booklet_4-14-2003.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KV38-U99T] (describing broadly the rules and regulations that apply when using
identifiable health information in research).
356. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 355, at 11.
357. Id. at 11–12.
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D. Incorporating Smart Grid Development Goals into EUPA
A final consideration that must be addressed within EUPA itself is the
recognition of the importance of smart meter data to the development of
the smart grid. As discussed in Part I, utilities have a real need for this
data and sharing smart grid data with each other and other entities in the
energy industry would go far in assisting with the smart grid. Much of
this data can and should be anonymized before sharing to better protect
consumers’ information. Fortunately, there are several different models
currently in existence for sharing this data that can serve as an example
for Congress.
Many utilities are starting to share anonymized energy-usage data to
encourage the continued development of the smart grid. For example,
Chicago’s utility, ComEd, now shares anonymized usage data with
commercial entities looking to develop new products, academics and
researchers using the data for energy-related scholarship, and companies
looking to develop new technology for the home.358 Illinois law prohibits
ComEd and other utilities “from sharing customers’ billing and usage
data without authorization, but it allows more freedom to share ‘generic
information.’”359 In Vermont, utilities are required to share “town-scaled
aggregate data” with the statewide energy-efficiency program
administrator to demonstrate which “communities have achieved the
greatest saving through efficiency, and also how much the need for new
electricity generation has been reduced.”360 These examples demonstrate
how anonymized, aggregated data can help energy-efficiency providers
and smart grid developers with more information about energy usage.
Ultimately, this information could help both utilities and other companies
optimize the smart grid and reduce energy consumption.
In addition to voluntarily anonymizing customer data, many utilities
also participate in the Green Button Initiative, which “fosters the
development, compliance, and adoption of the global Green Button
electricity-, natural gas-, and water-usage data-sharing standard” and
enables consumers to share their energy-usage data without any personal

358. See David J. Unger, Illinois Regulators Approve Utility Plan to Share Anonymous
Energy Usage Data, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 21, 2017), https://energynews.us/2017/
02/21/midwest/illinois-regulators-approve-utility-plan-to-share-anonymous-energy-usage-data/
[https://perma.cc/C7AV-XKT6] (noting that ComEd’s “Anonymous Data Service removes any
personal information⎯including names, addresses and electric account numbers⎯that might
identify individual users”).
359. Id.
360. AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., BEST PRACTICES FOR WORKING WITH
UTILITIES TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO ENERGY USAGE DATA 9 (2014).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

61

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 5

512

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

information attached to it.361 The Initiative helps customers protect their
private data while also encouraging them to share their energy-usage data
with interested third parties to better understand how they are consuming
energy.362 The Green Button Alliance, which includes utility members
who are a part of the Green Button Initiative, joined the DataGuard
Energy Data Partnership Program, which “is a voluntary program that
provides high-level principles around the treatment, retention and
disposal of customer data.”363 This program can also serve as a guide to
Congress when writing the necessary provisions of EUPA. It is vital that
EUPA encourage and enable the sharing of energy-usage information to
help with the continued development of the smart grid.
A final consideration for the protection of consumers’ smart meter
data is understanding the risk of other devices connecting to the smart
meter and potentially also recording the smart meter data. While the risk
presented by the growth of the Internet of Things and interconnected
devices in the home is outside the scope of this Article, Congress should
consider building in additional protections for devices that specifically
overlap with the smart meters in smart homes. For example, EUPA could
require a warrant for law enforcement to obtain all information collected
by the covered devices to ensure that all private power information is
afforded a consistent level of protection. EUPA could be written broadly
to be more inclusive in regard to the kind of devices that may connect to
a smart meter; “the exact technology that collects the information is not
the crucial point, but rather the nature of the information collected will
trigger the application of [the] statute.”364
While this solution is not a silver bullet and there will be continued
problems with both public and private entities improperly accessing
smart meter data, it is the most straightforward solution to start protecting
smart meter data today. Technology is progressing so fast that both the
courts and Congress have not been able to keep up with it. Time is of the
361. Green Button Alliance Launches Green Button Connect My Data (CMD) Certification
Program for Electricity, Natural Gas, and Water Utilities, GREEN BUTTON ALLIANCE (Sept. 5,
2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/green-button-alliance-launchesgreen-button-connect-my-data-cmd-certification-program-for-electricity-natural-gas-and-waterutilities-300706792.html [https://perma.cc/JM64-V6FU]; see also Green Button for My Home,
GREEN BUTTON DATA, http://www.greenbuttondata.org/residential.html [https://perma.cc/CY4A9SS8] (explaining how the program operates and how consumers can sign up).
362. Unger, supra note 358.
363. Smart Energy Consumer Collaborative and Green Button Alliance Become Inaugural
Members of DataGuard Energy Data Privacy Partnership Program, GREEN BUTTON ALLIANCE
(June 27, 2018), https://www.greenbuttonalliance.org/smart-energy-consumer-collaborative-andgreen-button-alliance-become-inaugural-members-of-dataguard-energy-data-privacy-partnershipprogram [https://perma.cc/T7XM-YQUF].
364. Bianchini, supra note 103, at 26 (arguing for an amendment to the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act with a fourth statute to encompass noncommunicative intimate
information collected by digital assistants).
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essence—Congress needs to act now to ensure that consumers’ intimate
data from the home is adequately protected. EUPA provides at least one
path forward for allowing the necessary access to important smart grid
data while also protecting consumers’ privacy in the home.
CONCLUSION
The development of the smart grid creates many benefits for energy
efficiency, environmental protection, and grid stability. The challenge is
whether society may allow the full exploitation of those benefits while
still protecting consumer privacy. Since society is currently at the
precipice of huge technological changes both in the home and in the smart
grid, now is the time to build in additional protections for consumers and
their homes.
Writing his dissent in Olmstead v. United States365 in 1928, Justice
Louis Brandeis recognized the risk that technology and the progression
of science posed to the people of the United States. He noted:
“[I]n the application of a constitution, our contemplation
cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.” The
progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.
Ways may some day be developed by which the
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled
to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home.366
It is fair to say that society may have reached the point that Justice
Brandeis was alluding to. Accessing smart meter data provides the
government with encyclopedic insight into occurrences and activities
within the home—perhaps the last sacred place recognized by the Fourth
Amendment. Yet current Fourth Amendment protections likely do not go
far enough in protecting smart meter data from improper use. Therefore,
Congress must step in to provide additional safeguards against this kind
of collection of information from the home. The proposed solution—
EUPA—will not protect everything that occurs within the home, but it
prevents both the government and commercial entities from capitalizing
on this new required technology. The Act would require a warrant before
law enforcement may access smart meter data. It would also require
consumer knowledge and consent before their private data may be shared
with commercial entities. And it would place the regulation and oversight
365. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
366. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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of this intimate data within the purview of one federal agency that can
track and monitor the utilization of smart meter data.
Finally, the efficient and effective use of smart meters is key to
combating climate change. Instead of getting in the way of utilities
sharing and utilizing this necessary information, EUPA would recognize
the importance of anonymizing and aggregating community energyusage data. It is integral that utilities have this data to increase the
efficiency of the grid as a whole and to help decarbonize the electricity
sector, but the government must implement safeguards to protect
consumers and the intimacies of the home. EUPA provides a way to
encourage smart grid development while also protecting consumers’ data
privacy. And due to the continued advancement of technology in this
area, no more time can be spared in creating a regulatory framework that
addresses these issues. Smart meters should be optimized along with the
development of the smart grid, but their optimization should not come at
the cost of consumer privacy.
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